Research

PUBLICATIONS

Outsourcing Education: Experimental Evidence from Liberia
(with Mauricio Romero and Justin Sandefur)
American Economic Review, Volume 110, No. 2, 2020
AEA registry

Abstract
In 2016, the Liberian government delegated management of 93 randomly selected public schools to private providers. Providers received US$50 per pupil, on top of US$50 per pupil annual expenditure in control schools. After one academic year, students in outsourced schools scored 0.18σ higher in English and mathematics. We do not find heterogeneity in learning gains or enrollment by student characteristics, but there is significant heterogeneity across providers. While outsourcing appears to be a cost-effective way to use new resources to improve test scores, some providers engaged in unforeseen and potentially harmful behavior, complicating any assessment of welfare gains.

WORKING PAPERS

The politics of public service reform
Revise & Resubmit, AEJ: Applied Economics
VoxDev column — Medium post — CESifo WP 10633— SSRN

Abstract
This paper provides experimental evidence on the electoral effect of a large education reform in a developing democracy. Despite significantly improving school quality, the reform reduced the incumbent party’s presidential vote share by 3 percentage points (9%). This does not imply that ordinary voters opposed the policy’s aims: electoral effects were positively correlated with school quality effects, and household surveys showed strong support. However, the reform also reduced teachers’ job satisfaction, support for the incumbent government, and political activity. The reform lost the most votes where it caused the greatest political disengagement of teachers.

Sibling Spillovers and Free Schooling
(with João Ferreira)
Revise & Resubmit, Review of Economics and Statistics
CESifo WP 11436 — IZA DP 17228

Abstract
We use administrative data to measure sibling spillovers on academic performance before and after Tanzania’s introduction of Free Secondary Education (FSE). Prior to FSE, students whose older siblings narrowly passed the secondary school entrance exam were less likely to go to secondary school themselves; with FSE, the effect became positive. A triple differences analysis, using geographic variation in FSE exposure, shows that FSE caused the reversal. Negative pre-FSE spillovers were concentrated in poorer regions. Positive post-FSE spillovers were largest for lower-performing younger siblings. Our results demonstrate that FSE alleviated financial constraints, allowing families to distribute educational investments more equitably rather than concentrating resources on high-performing children.

Secondary school access raises primary school achievement
Revise & Resubmit, AEJ: Economic Policy
CESifo WP 11343

Abstract
I use variation in ex-ante school fee payments to measure how Free Secondary Education (FSE) affected primary students in Tanzania. I first confirm FSE increased secondary access: secondary enrollments rose, household spending on secondary school fees plummeted, and elites’ transition premium disappeared. I then show that FSE increased primary exam pass rates by 6% and secondary transition rates by 23%. This was not due to supply inputs: there was no effect on school entry, and class sizes rose. Instead it appears to be driven by demand-side investments: primary students selected into better schools, attended more, and worked less.

The Political Consequences of Controversial Education Reform: Lessons from Wisconsin’s Act 10
(with Barbara Biasi)
Under Review

Abstract
We study the electoral consequences of Wisconsin’s Act 10, a controversial law that weakened teachers’ unions and enabled flexible teacher pay. Exploiting variation in the timing of implementation across districts, we first show that it raised student test scores, reduced union revenues, and created winners and losers among teachers in terms of pay. We then show that the reform increased the vote share for the incumbent GOP governor by about 2 pp and lowered Democratic campaign contributions from teachers and unions. The electoral gains were driven by districts with ex ante stronger unions and more potential winners among teachers and students.

Won by a mile: Electoral effects of the Interstate Highway System
(with Daniel Leff Yaffe and Alejandro Nakab)
Under Review

Abstract
We measure the electoral effects of the construction of the US Interstate Highway System (IHS). We show descriptively that construction follows state electoral cycles. To identify causal effects, we use a shift-share instrument based on temporal variation in federal funding formulas and geographic variation in planned mileage. Completing one extra highway mile in a county during an election year increases vote share for incumbent governors’ and senators’ parties by 2.9 and 2.7 percentage points respectively, with positive spillover effects on unconnected neighboring counties. Electoral effects for incumbent presidents are negative, driven by states governed by the opposing party.

Tax morale, public goods, and politics: Experimental evidence from Mozambique
(with Pedro C. Vicente)
Under Review
IGC WP MOZ-22067

Abstract
Tax revenue is vital for development, but governments must balance raising revenues with maintaining political support. Partnering with a city government in Mozambique, we experimentally test a grounded hypothesis: that tax morale and political support are increased by information highlighting 1) public good provision and 2) local political autonomy. We find that the treatments have different strengths. Public goods information raises tax morale, driven by areas of low baseline public good provision, but has no effect on voting. The political message increases electoral support but raises tax morale only among co-partisans. Balancing tax morale and political support requires careful communication.

Priming the pump: Can upfront interest payments increase savings?
(with Peter Carroll, Flora Myamba, Daniel Nielson, Joseph Price, and Phillip Roessler)
Under Review
IPA summary

Abstract
We encouraged an NGO’s cash transfer recipients in Tanzania to keep 10% of the transfer in their mobile money account until a certain date. We randomized whether doing so would permit them to keep a bonus provided upfront, receive an equivalent amount of “interest” at the end, or confer no benefit. Mobile wallet administrative data show that the Upfront group were 14pp (74%) more likely to reach the savings target (net of the bonus). This was driven by participants with higher balances ex-ante. Offering interest payments at the end had no effect on saving, despite a significantly above-market interest rate.

On the Political Economy of Urbanization: Experimental Evidence from Mozambique
(with Alex Armand, Frederica Mendonça, and Pedro C. Vicente)

Abstract
Urbanization can be a force for structural transformation, but it remains unclear whether and when it aligns with the political interests of incumbent city governments. We partner with the government of a Mozambican city to study the political economy effects of a randomized program aimed at integrating rural migrants. The program reduced urban out-migration of migrants and increased in-migration of migrants’ relatives. It increased migrants’ political participation, and did not cause significant backlash among non-migrants. In a random subset of blocks where local leaders were involved in administering the program, the program functioned better and crowded in leaders’ electoral campaign effort.

WORK IN PROGRESS