

On the Political Economy of Urbanization: Experimental Evidence from Mozambique*

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Abstract

Urbanization can be a force for structural transformation, but it remains unclear whether and when it aligns with the political interests of incumbent city governments. We partner with the government of a Mozambican city to study the political economy effects of a randomized program aimed at integrating rural migrants. The program reduced urban out-migration of migrants and increased in-migration of migrants' relatives. It increased migrants' political participation, and did not cause significant backlash among non-migrants. In a random subset of blocks where local leaders were involved in administering the program, the program functioned better and crowded in leaders' electoral campaign effort.

Keywords: political economy, urbanization, rural migrants, migrant integration, political behavior, Mozambique, Africa.

JEL Codes: D72, O18, J61, O12, 055.

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1 Introduction

Urbanization has been a key driver of economic development and structural transformation (Kuznets, 1971; V. Henderson et al., 1995; Garriga et al., 2023; Imbert et al., 2021). At the individual level, rural-to-urban migration increases wages (Young, 2013; Gollin et al., 2014; Hamory et al., 2021) and human capital (Alesina et al., 2021; Cockx, 2021; Nakamura et al., 2022; Van Maarseveen, 2022; Becker et al., 2023).¹ Sub-Saharan Africa is the world’s fastest-urbanizing region, and governments there have an opportunity to manage this growth in productive ways. The trend is likely to accelerate in coming decades: climate change appears to increase rural-to-urban migration, with most of this increase happening within rather than across countries (J. Henderson et al., 2017; Castells-Quintana et al., 2021; Burzyński et al., 2022). But how best to address the negative societal consequences of increased urbanization is the subject of open debate (Lagakos, 2020; Glaeser & Xiong, 2017; Bryan et al., 2020). The degree to which rural-to-urban migration can produce structural change depends largely on urban economies’ ability to absorb workers pushed out of agriculture (Colmer, 2021; Gollin et al., 2015).

However, there is little empirical evidence on whether local politicians in the developing world have incentives to facilitate recent migrants’ labor market integration. International migration often produces a political backlash in destination jurisdictions (Mayda et al., 2022; Alesina & Tabellini, 2024). And existing research on richer countries shows that incumbent city residents often create barriers to new arrivals (“NIMBYism” — see Duranton & Puga, 2023; Tricaud, 2025; Feler & Henderson, 2011). By contrast, the political economy of internal migration in the developing world is more nuanced for three reasons. First, internal migration is a much larger phenomenon than international migration — by some estimates, there are three to four times more internal migrants than international migrants. Second, unlike international migrants, internal migrants themselves represent a potential voting constituency for local politicians, creating a potential electoral counterweight to possible backlash from existing residents (though it is also possible existing residents would reward successful efforts to better manage the flow of migrants). Finally, rural-to-urban migration may represent a force for improved democracy by facilitating collective action and accountability, especially in less democratic countries (Glaeser & Steinberg, 2017).² This highlights a potential tension between national and local politicians’ incentives for facilitating urbanization. Many undemocratic national regimes in sub-Saharan Africa impose important frictions on urbanization, for example by controlling land rights to impede peasants from leaving rural areas. This tension may also help

¹Ravallion et al. (2007) remind us that urban poverty should not be disregarded when thinking about urbanization.

²Indeed, international immigration has been shown to improve political institutions in migrants’ point of origin (Batista & Vicente, 2011; Docquier et al., 2016).

explain the relatively limited capacity of city governments in the developing world to mitigate the negative externalities of urban density (J. V. Henderson & Turner, 2020).

This paper uses a field experiment to study the political effects of a program enacted by a city government in Mozambique to integrate rural migrants. Mozambique is representative of sub-Saharan Africa in having a very large share of agricultural employment. Its political situation is also similar to those in many countries across the region. The nationally ruling party (FRELIMO) has dominated since independence, exercising tight control over rural areas and migration through appointed local leaders who have authority over land allocation (see Byamugisha (2013) for a review of related policy). Despite this, the country is urbanizing, and opposition parties govern a handful of cities.³ The policy we study was sponsored by the municipality of Quelimane, one of those opposition-held cities, with a population of around 500,000. At its lowest administrative level, it is divided into about 500 “blocks,” each headed by a block leader appointed by the elected city government.

The program entailed the face-to-face coaching of migrants in several rounds of visits to their homes over the course of one year. The main component of the program was a job matching service to connect migrants with employers drawn from several waves of job censuses of the city. An algorithm was used to provide each treated migrant with contact information for employers currently hiring in the migrant’s preferred geographical and occupational areas. Migrants were also taught about how to use mobile money as a way to facilitate remittances. Finally, they were given information about the city, its public services, and voting. We randomized treatment at the block level. In blocks assigned to the “basic” treatment arm, the program was administered by apolitical functionaries. To further study the political dimensions of the policy, a separate “leader” treatment arm held the content of the program constant, but involved local block leaders in its implementation.

To measure the policy and political effects of the program, we conducted three waves of surveys and behavioral measures — before, during, and after the end of the program. To provide a comprehensive view of the program’s effects, we surveyed not only the migrants eligible for the program, but also the households they had left behind in their points of origin (“origin relatives”); their non-migrant block neighbors (“residents”); and their block leaders (“leaders”). Survey data give us a comprehensive picture of program’s effects on perceptions about migrant integration, labor market outcomes, use of mobile money, migration, interactions with leaders, and political preferences. In addition to survey data, we designed behavioral measures to observe leaders’ political mobilization and campaigning efforts for the

³It was also in the cities that the country witnessed major violent demonstrations in the aftermath of the 2024 elections - see for instance <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/12/11/protests-have-shut-down-mozambique>.

municipal election held three months after the program ended (and over a year after it had started). We measured migrants' publicly declared political support by observing political objects such as signs and t-shirts. We measured voter participation by checking respondents' fingers for the indelible ink used at polling stations shortly after the election. These behavioral measurements allow us to minimize biases of standard survey questions about politics (Aker et al., 2017; Grácio & Vicente, 2021; Ahmed et al., 2024).

We first show that although the migrant integration program was carried out faithfully, it did not meet all its policy aims. Migrants in treated blocks were much more likely to have heard about the program and to report being involved in it, and origin relatives of treated migrants were more likely to have heard of the program. Treated migrants used more mobile money services and made more transfers, as reported by both themselves and origin relatives. Treated migrants were significantly more likely to have heard about job opportunities. Despite this, however, migrants in the basic treatment were significantly less likely to have a job than migrants in control blocks by program's end. This is consistent with the program raising recipients' reservation wages (Kelley et al., 2024), and consistent with other literature highlighting the difficulty of reducing labor market frictions (Caria et al., 2024; Abebe et al., 2017).

We next show that in spite of the program's seemingly lackluster policy impact, it had important effects on both migration and political participation. Treatment made migrants less likely to move back home, and their origin relatives more likely to move to the city. Treatment increased migrants' publicly declared support for parties, measured through objects displayed at their home or on their body. There is also suggestive evidence that it increased migrant election turnout — as measured by checking fingers for the indelible ink of the polling booth — and raised self-reported vote share for the incumbent city government among both migrants and their origin relatives. It did not significantly reduce incumbent city government vote share among residents.

Finally, we show that involving local leaders in the program changed their behavior and increased their effort. Leaders in "leader treatment" blocks were much more likely than those in the "basic treatment" to be aware of the policy and to report being involved in it. They reported more sympathetic attitudes toward migrants. They knew more of the migrants on their block, and more migrants and residents on their block reported knowing them and contacting them. This appears to have improved the functioning of the program: the negative employment effects of the program were absent, and migrants were in fact working more hours, in blocks where leaders were involved. And it affected leaders' campaigning efforts: political stickers provided only to block leaders were much more likely to be observed on houses in "leader treatment" blocks. We show suggestive evidence that some dimensions of leaders' campaign effort were

increased by the program even in blocks where they were not directly involved.

Our paper's main contribution is to the literature on the political economy of urbanization and internal migration. The literature on international migration in developed countries mostly finds migrants to be a political liability for incumbent politicians (Alesina & Tabellini, 2024; Mayda et al., 2022). Incumbent city residents in the upper- and upper-middle-income countries tend to oppose urban growth (Duranton & Puga, 2023; Tricaud, 2025; Feler & Henderson, 2011). There is some related work on efforts to reduce incumbent residents' resistance to immigrants, with Cattaneo & Grieco (2021) showing positive effects of an information intervention about the positive impact of immigrants, and Baseler et al. (2023) finding that redistributing social benefits towards natives makes them more sympathetic to refugees in Uganda. However, the potential of new internal migrants themselves as a political force has been largely ignored by the empirical economics literature. Our paper shows that efforts to integrate migrants can yield political dividends not only among migrants but also among public officials.

We also add to the broader literature on the political effects of public services. Direct transfers, whether clientelistic or programmatic, have been shown to win votes in many contexts (Wantchekon, 2003; Manacorda et al., 2011). But the literature on electoral effects of public services more broadly is mixed. Incumbents have been shown to pay an electoral price for an anti-poverty program in Uganda (Blattman et al., 2018), a job guarantee in India (Zimmermann, 2021), and a school reform in Liberia (Sandholtz, 2023). Our paper speaks not only to this literature on voter reactions to public service provision, but also to work about the role of local leaders. Two related papers, Bergeron et al. (2023) and Shenoy & Zimmermann (2022), highlight how the knowledge of local leaders can be valuable in both public administration and political mobilization, respectively. Our paper shows how these two aspects of local leaders' roles are connected.

Our paper also adds to the large literature addressing frictions to internal migration. The gains to alleviating these frictions can be large Bryan & Morten (2019); Morten & Oliveira (2018). Bryan et al. (2014) show that these frictions can be responsive to small monetary incentives, while other work shows that information frictions also play a role (McKenzie et al., 2013; Baseler, 2023).⁴ Our paper emphasizes that political constraints need to be taken into account when considering policy interventions to reduce migration frictions.

We also contribute to the literature on labor market policy interventions in developing countries. A review by McKenzie (2017) finds that many of these policies find no significant impacts on either em-

⁴In related work, Batista & Narciso (2018) demonstrate that increasing contact between migrants and their families has positive impacts on remittances sent home.

ployment or earnings, perhaps because urban labor markets in developing countries tend to function reasonably well already. Consistently, [Kelley et al. \(2024\)](#) find that a digital job matching platform reduced employment by raising reservation wages. Other studies find positive employment impacts of job matching interventions in the Philippines and Ethiopia ([Beam, 2016](#); [Abebe et al., 2021](#)). We show that even a labor market policy which fails to live up to its designers' expectations can have meaningful political impacts.⁵

This paper is organized as follows. We first describe the context of our study in Mozambique. Then, we describe our experimental design, including treatments, sampling, randomization, measurement, estimation strategy, and hypotheses. Subsequently, we show results and conclude.

2 Context

Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, with the 5th lowest GDP per capita in the world (at USD 1566). This is related to the fact that close to 70% of the population is employed in agriculture, with very low levels of productivity. With 39% of the Mozambican population living in urban areas in 2023, urbanization has been happening in the country, as this figure has clearly increased in the last 20 years: it was 30% in 2004. However, the proportion of urban population is still clearly below the average of Sub-Saharan Africa (43%) and of the world (57%).⁶

At the same time, Mozambique has been governed by a strong party at the central level (FRELIMO) since independence in 1975. Until the first elections in 1994, the approach was explicitly socialist with tight control over the territory from the central government through appointed local leaders. After that, despite externally-induced economic reforms, the ruling party has not dramatically changed the development and political approach over the territory, maintaining the traditional discourse in favor of rural development, which emphasizes supporting the small peasant, with no clear benefits seen in urbanization. One important example in terms of consistent public policy is the continuing conservative approach over land property, which is to this day (since independence), held by the state in the whole country. The political interests of the ruling party are difficult to separate from these positions: while in rural areas the ruling party easily controls the population through incentives mediated by appointed local leaders (e.g.,

⁵Although not the central focus of this paper, our results also build on existing studies showing the important role of mobile money in migrant remittances and financial inclusion. [Suri & Jack \(2016\)](#) find that the M-PESA in Kenya led to changes in the occupational choice of women from agriculture to business. [Batista & Vicente \(2024\)](#) run a field experiment introducing mobile money in rural Mozambique and conclude that it incentivized rural-to-urban migration.

⁶All figures are from the World Development Indicators 2024, latest available years.

who have a degree of discretion in allocating land), that is less the case in urban areas. In fact, the ruling party only lets municipal elections happen in cities – it is only in a few of those that the opposition has made some ground and won elections.

Quelimane is one of those cities, as it has been held by the opposition since 2011, when the current mayor, Manuel de Araújo, was elected for the first mandate. He now represents the main opposition party, RENAMO. Like many African cities, Quelimane has grown in recent decades, largely driven by the natural arrival of rural migrants seeking better economic opportunities. Being the capital and largest city of the province of Zambézia, Quelimane has received many rural migrants from that province but also from the rest of the country. The city's population more than doubled since 2010 to reach over 500,000 today, making it the 7th largest city in Mozambique.⁷ The city is divided geographically into three administrative layers, depending on the municipal council headed by the mayor: five “administrative posts,” which are subdivided into 54 “neighborhoods,” which are subdivided into 540 blocks. Each block is headed by a block leader, who is appointed by the hierarchical structure stemming from the mayor.⁸

Block leaders are therefore the lowest level of city government hierarchy. They do not receive formal wages but tend to be respected figures whose opinion carries some weight in the block. Their role consists largely in helping to settle conflicts between block residents, which requires knowing the residents and being aware of when people move in or out. They also serve as a bridge to the neighborhood leaders and the rest of the municipal government hierarchy, being responsible for passing information up the chain about the needs of the block (e.g., resources for coping with floods, which are common in Quelimane), as well as down the chain, enabling the local implementation of public projects (e.g., construction works). The block leader is not a formal partisan member, and less than two-thirds of block leaders report being registered in a political party at the beginning of our project (though over 90% of those belonged to RENAMO). Insofar as they owe their position to the incumbent government, their incentives generally align with its electoral fortunes.

It is important to note that our project was implemented in the final half of the previous mandate of the current mayor of Quelimane and that we measure most outcomes during the October 2023 municipal elections in the city.⁹ These elections were won by the incumbent mayor/RENAMO after a heated post-electoral period which ended with a supreme court decision supporting RENAMO's allegations of

⁷World Population Review: <https://web.archive.org/web/20240123115845/https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/quelimane-population>.

⁸However, there is often some element of popular will in their selection: block residents can propose a candidate for the job, and neighborhood chiefs often approve them.

⁹We also have some data from the 2024 national elections, which we report in the Appendix.

electoral fraud against FRELIMO.

3 Experimental design

3.1 The program

The program we study in this paper provided an integration package to support recent rural migrants in Quelimane, Mozambique. It was sponsored by the corresponding municipality and known as “Quelimane trabalha com todos” (Quelimane works with everybody). The program was tailored to recent rural migrants whom we define as having set residence in Quelimane up to 12 months prior to the beginning of the project implementation, and as intending to stay in the city at least one year. It aimed to reduce the logistical and psychic barriers migrants face, easing their integration into their new environment (McKenzie, 2024). It featured individual coaching sessions through five house visits to migrants, entailing approximately one hour of face-to-face contact per visit. The first round of visits was in August 2022 and the last in July 2023. Contents included general information about the city, job matching between the migrant and opportunities in the city, and an introduction to mobile money. When migrants were not at home, appointments were made to visit at another time. Importantly, in its main treatment variation, the program delivery was mediated by the block leader. We now turn to detailing these contents.¹⁰

3.1.1 Job matching, mobile money, and the city

The main component of the face-to-face visits was job matching: most of the rural migrants in Quelimane are economic migrants who come to the city in search for better economic opportunities. Program participants were allocated contacts (name and phone number) of potential job offers to rural migrants. To collect the information relating to these job offers, we conducted two censuses of job offers by visiting every house and establishment in the city as well as four rounds of job updating by phone with the previously collected contacts. We managed to collect approximately 1500 job offers during this project.¹¹ Program implementers allocated these jobs to specific migrants based on the elicitation of the migrants’ job preferences. Each migrant was entitled to up to ten job offer possibilities and given the corresponding contacts. In the last two visits, the implementer linked each potential employer and migrant by contacting the

¹⁰A full coverage is found in Section A of the Appendix.

¹¹In somewhat related work, Dillon et al. (2024) examine the effects on small and medium enterprises in Tanzania of being listed in a telephone directory. They find that the firms expand their communication networks, increase sales, and make greater use of mobile money, with positive spillovers to firms in the same village.

employer during the house visit and setting an interview date. As a final step of each visit, implementers always sent a text message to each migrant with the potential employers' contacts. The main sectors of the job opportunities that were shared in this program included housekeeping, babysitting, cleaning, and gardening.

Another important component of the information package shared through the program was an introduction to mobile money. As part of the face-to-face contact, program implementers shared a presentation on Mozambique's leading mobile money service (M-PESA). It included information on how to open an account, cash-in and cash-out electronic money, as well as to make transfers. In the third round of the visits, participants were given a small endowment (the minimum possible) to cash-in and transfer to a rural family member. It served the purpose of incentivizing the opening of accounts for those not holding one, and trialing transfers to the migrants' origin household using mobile money, which was likely to induce information sharing (namely about the program) between treated migrants and their origin households. The inclusion of this module was guided by the idea that the financial inclusion of migrants is an important dimension of their integration.

Finally, institutional information about the city was added to the package. The first two visits to migrant participants in the program included a general presentation of the city developed by the municipality which encompassed information about the political context of the city, administrative divisions, documentation needed for residence in the city, electoral registration and voting process (namely in face of the 2023 municipal elections), as well as access to local schooling, healthcare, other infrastructures, and culture. By the third visit, the presentation was incorporated into a survey platform, which allowed to turn it into an interactive experience centered on asking migrants questions regarding the information presented.

3.1.2 The participation of block leaders

The main version of the program submission contained the explicit support and active participation of the block leaders corresponding to the blocks where migrant participants resided. In each round of visits the field team initiated face-to-face conversations with the visited migrants by showing a video on tablets with a short message from the corresponding block leader, who expressed clear support for the program and incentivized migrants to follow the instructions and advice of the program implementers. At the end of each visit, implementers reminded migrants about the leader's name and contact information to enable reaching him/her in case of necessity. The field team also sent a text message with the leader's name and

contacts at the end of the conversation.

Block leaders were encouraged to be present in all rounds of face-to-face contact with the migrants. However their presence was only systematic in the fifth visit when they all participated in the house visits belonging to their corresponding blocks alongside the field team. We note that in the fourth round all leaders were asked to emphasize the relevance of participating in elections when speaking in the video that was shown in the face-to-face visits to migrants. The content and framing of such message was left at their discretion, with most leaders delivering a political message related to the approaching municipal elections of 2023.

3.2 Sampling and randomization

Our baseline sample of recent migrants (as defined above) set the stage for sampling in this project. It is representative of the full population of households containing at least one recent migrant, clustering by city blocks. Our enumerators sampled within each block by starting at a randomly chosen point and following a deterministic algorithm to dictate the order in which they approached households to ask if they included any recent migrants. In all affirmative cases, they conducted a baseline survey interview. In each block, enumerators continued this sampling process until all houses had been visited, or until eight migrant households had been found. This limit was reached in 112 of the 540 total blocks in the city. No migrants were found in a few blocks, which made them not eligible for treatment. Our study sample is then composed of 497 city blocks.

We note that the sample of migrants in the measurement of our study was recruited in two waves: the initial one already referred, from October to December 2021, and a second wave recruited in September 2022.¹² We interviewed 2321 migrants in the first wave of recruitment and another 1312 migrants in the second wave.¹³

At the same time of the recruitment of the first wave of migrants, we also sampled residents in each block, defined as those residing in Quelimane for over two years. The sampling process was equivalent to the one mentioned for migrants but with the above-referred criterion. We targeted two residents per block and ended up with a total of 1109 residents in our sample. Immediately following the sampling of

¹²In this wave, we used the same criteria to define (recent) migrants as before. We looked for three migrants in each of the 497 blocks of the study. By the time the program began in August 2023, migrants from the first wave had been in the city for between about 1 to 2 years; migrants in the second wave began the second round of the intervention having arrived in the city at most 12 months prior. The migrants in the second wave were recruited after treatment had already begun; the first round of the intervention they received was the second, so the treated participants in this wave only received four rounds of treatments in total. Our results control for this sample difference.

¹³This design allows some variation in treatment effects employing time since migration.

migrants (first wave) and residents in January to February of 2022, we interviewed all the block leaders corresponding to the 497 blocks in the experiment.

During the first project surveys, migrants were also asked to report the name and contact of the closest person in their origin districts, with whom they still keep contact. We collected 2519 contacts.

We randomly allocated city blocks to three comparison groups: one receiving the full treatment, including the participation of the block leader (leader treatment); one receiving the same integration package but with no participation of the block leader (basic treatment); and a control group receiving no intervention. Randomization was stratified within strata of up to three blocks. These strata were created by sorting blocks within neighborhoods by the number of migrants in our baseline survey.¹⁴ The 497 blocks in the study were then split into the leader treatment (168 blocks), the simple treatment (164 blocks), and the control group (165 blocks). A map representing the randomization of blocks into treatment conditions is presented in Appendix Figure ??.¹⁵

3.3 Measurement

Our measurement in this field experiment comes from a set of surveys and behavioral activities we organized. We display the full timeline of the project in Appendix Figure C1. We collected survey data from block leaders, migrants, and residents at the baseline (as described above), close to the end of the intervention (before the last round), and endline (after the end of the intervention, in August - leaders - and November - migrants and residents - of 2023). Two phone surveys of migrants' origin households were conducted at the time of the midline and endline (as defined above). We also conducted two small post-endline phone surveys, one for migrant's origin households, approximately one year after the treatment finished, and another for leaders, after the October 2024 national elections. All surveys measured the demographic and socioeconomic traits of the corresponding individuals and households. In addition, they measured civic and political attitudes. In Appendix E, we provide a detailed description of all outcome variables we employ in this paper.

We also formulated and implemented a set of behavioral measures related to political behaviors. The first measurement was a Structured Community Activity (SCA) (Casey et al., 2012) which targeted block leaders' campaign mobilization as measured by the ability to get together bicycle taxi drivers to campaign for the incumbent mayor (just before the 2023 municipal elections). In this activity, block leaders were

¹⁴Each stratum consists of up to three blocks because some neighborhoods' number of blocks is not divisible by three.

¹⁵We provide fuller details about sampling and randomization in Appendix B.

instructed to collect contacts of bicycle taxi drivers in their blocks (lists were collected per leader/block) and to get them together for a block meeting at a specific date set and observed by enumerators. Bicycle taxi drivers are the main means of transportation in Quelimane, and highly associated with the incumbent mayor in Quelimane, who initiated and has used bicycle rallies in all his political campaigns. With this activity, we expect to measure leaders' campaign efforts and political influence.

The second behavioral measurement was directed at migrants and aimed at capturing migrants' and residents' political mobilization. While surveying migrants and residents at the midline and the endline (right after the 2023 municipal election), enumerators looked for displayed political objects in their homes or vests, like stickers, posters, t-shirts, caps, etc, and recorded their observations.

The third was on voter turnout after the October 2023 local elections in Quelimane through the systematic checking of inked fingers of block leaders, migrants, and residents. In Mozambique, like in many other countries, voters' index fingers are colored with purple ink at the polling station after voting. We understood this feature of electoral procedures as a good opportunity to measure political participation in our study participants. To do so, we hired a large team of enumerators who canvassed the whole city in the two days following the election day, checking whether participants' fingers were inked.

The fourth behavioral measurement was an SCA based on the distribution of stickers by block leaders praising the mayor for the integration of migrants through the program. Each leader received 40 brown stickers and was instructed to distribute them among households in their blocks. The protocol encouraged hanging the stickers on the houses' front doors. This allows us to identify stickers visible on migrants' houses as a measure of political mobilization and block leader influence, as well as of corresponding responsiveness by citizens. We also had a version of this sticker measurement directly distributed to migrants and residents (not through block leaders). The corresponding stickers had a different color (pink) but were otherwise identical. During the endline survey with the migrants and the residents, enumerators observed whether the stickers (of both types) were hanging on the doors of respondents. The two versions of the stickers allow us to isolate the role of the leader when distributing stickers. We show images of these stickers in Figure D2 in Appendix.¹⁶

¹⁶See Appendix D for further details on measurement.

4 Estimation strategy and hypotheses

We estimate treatment effects of the leader and basic interventions employing standard econometric analysis of experiments. The following specification is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS):

$$Y_{ibs} = \alpha + \beta_L TL_b + \beta_B TB_b + \lambda_s + \omega \mathbf{Z}_b + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_{ibs} \quad (1)$$

where TL_b and TB_b are indicator variables for living in a block in the leader treatment or the basic treatment (respectively), λ_s are strata fixed effects, \mathbf{Z}_b is a vector of block-level controls,¹⁷ and \mathbf{X}_i is a set of individual characteristics¹⁸. ε_{ib} is an individual-specific error term.

When baseline data are available, we implement an ANCOVA specification by including the dependent variable at baseline ($Y_{ibs,0}$) as a control variable:

$$Y_{ibs} = \alpha + \beta_L TL_b + \beta_B TB_b + Y_{ibs,0} + \lambda_s + \omega \mathbf{Z}_b + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_{ibs}. \quad (2)$$

For outcomes measured in both post-baseline surveys ($t = 1, 2$), we can also estimate effects using multiple measures in time (midline and endline) using the following specification (McKenzie, 2012):

$$Y_{ibs,t} = \alpha + \beta_L TL_b + \beta_B TB_b + \sum_{t=1}^2 \delta_t + \lambda_s + \omega \mathbf{Z}_b + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_{ibs,t} \quad (3)$$

where δ_t boil down to one time dummy distinguishing post baseline periods 1 and 2.

Standard errors are clustered at the city block level in all regressions at the level of individual migrants, residents, or migrants' origin households.

In the analysis of this experiment we follow closely the pre-analysis plan (Armand et al., 2024). Our main hypotheses are the following.

First, we expect that both treatments increase awareness of the program. Interaction with local leaders could also increase. Local leaders could take the opportunity of the program to mobilize migrants politically, namely through clientelism. Migrants could participate more in campaigning and elections, as well as support more often the local incumbent. It is possible that these effects travel to migrants' origin households as well.

In terms of economic effects of the treatments, we expect better views about migrants and their inte-

¹⁷This is a proxy for the block population.

¹⁸These are: age, gender, and the baseline survey wave (in the case of migrants).

gration in the city. In view of additional job opportunities, we also expect positive impacts on employment and work hours, higher use of mobile money, namely for transfers to migrants' origin households. We hypothesize potential impacts on migration, in terms of retaining migrants in the city, and promoting the migration of their relatives from the origin.

Linking to the specifications above, and assuming the referred outcome variables to be measured positively, we can summarize our first hypothesis as:

Hypothesis 1: $\beta_L, \beta_B > 0$.

Our design includes a treatment variation that erases the involvement of the leader in the program implementation with migrants. Our expectation is that all referred treatment effects are lower for this basic treatment than for the leader treatment. Block leaders are locally influential figures and are expected to increase the effectiveness of the program. We expect that block leaders are particularly able to influence political outcomes, given the political dimension of their role and its clientelistic nature. Our second hypothesis is then:

Hypothesis 2: $\beta_L > \beta_B$.

5 Results

5.1 Descriptives

We begin by describing our sample at the baseline. Control blocks have 145 households on average (household proxy)¹⁹. They also have 4.8 sampled migrants, 43% of illegal construction, approximately 25 taxi drivers, and similar distances to closest school, market, and water fountain, between 1.5 and 1.6 Kms. These results are shown in Appendix, Table B2.

Block leaders in the control group are on average 50 years old, and are typically male (67%). Seventy-two percent are married or cohabiting and 66% are Catholic. Education levels are relatively low, with 22% illiterate and 42% having completed primary school. Ninety-five percent of the block leaders own the

¹⁹This household proxy was constructed based on the visits conducted all throughout the city when looking for potential employers, during the first intervention round. Field administrators were instructed to attempt every house in every block and register it as a survey entry, regardless of the outcome. Further details on this process can be found in Appendix Section A.

dwelling where they live. We also observe that leaders have been in office for 3.6 years. Seventy-seven percent of them report liking migrants but only 2% think the government is helping the poor (at the baseline). These results are shown in Appendix, Table B3.

The sample of migrants collected during the first sampling wave is much younger, with an average of 24 years of age for the control group. Sixty-six percent are male. In view of the mean age, it is not surprising that only 37% are married or cohabiting and that their average number of children is just over one. Fifty-nine percent of the migrants in the control group are Catholic. In terms of schooling, 34% are illiterate and 32% have completed primary school. Twenty-two percent had no occupation at the baseline. Only 24% of the migrant sample at the baseline had contacted the local leader in the previous year. Fifty percent moved to Quelimane to work. They report their main struggles to be finding a job (33%) and making friends (14%). We show these statistics in Table B4 in the Appendix.

Now turning to the sample of residents, we observe that the control group had a mean age of 34 years and 40% are male. Given their older mean age, it is also not surprising that forty six percent of them are married or cohabiting and they have an average of slightly more than 2 children. Sixty three percent of them are Catholic. Despite the lower levels of illiteracy - 18% - only thirty six percent of residents completed primary schooling. 40% of the resident sample had contacted the local leader in the previous year. These statistics can be found in Table B5 in the Appendix.

Finally, turning to the table for the district relatives, we see that it is slightly older than the migrants, with a mean mean age of 33 years and that 56% are male. Forty-seven percent are either married or cohabiting and they have on average 2 children. Surprisingly, only 14% are illiterate but only thirty-five percent completed primary education. 18% have no occupation and only six percent of district relatives are students. These measures can be found in Table B6 in the Appendix.

These tables also show balance between treatment and control groups. From the 84 tests shown including the null that the characteristics of the treatments are (individually or together) the same as the control, as well as the null that the two treatments are jointly equal to zero in explaining the characteristics of the sample units, we only find nine significant tests at standard levels out of 116 tests, well below 10%. This reassures us that the randomization was effective at building comparable groups.

5.2 Treatment adherence

We now turn to the analysis of treatment effects, starting with the outcome variables related to treatment adherence. We begin by showing results on program awareness in Figure 1. These include survey ques-

tions asked to leaders, migrants, residents, and migrants' origin households on whether they have heard about the program "Quelimane trabalha com todos", and whether the survey respondent, the family of the respondent, rural migrants, and block people in general were involved in the program. Our regressions employ the stacked specification in equation 3 including midline and endline survey measures.²⁰

We find that the leader treatment was particularly effective with leaders: they are more likely to have heard about the program, by 13 percentage points; they are also more likely to report being involved, by 18 percentage points, as they are to report that rural migrant and block people in general were involved, by 12 and 13 percentage points, respectively. All referred effects are significant at the 1 percent level. They are also statistically different from those of the basic treatment, which is never significantly different from the control. We note that a substantial proportion of the leaders in the control group has heard about the program (72%).

We observe positive and significant effects of both treatments for migrants: hearing about the program increases by 7 and 8 percentage points for the leader and basic treatments, respectively. These effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and undistinguishable. Similar patterns are found for the migrant respondent involvement, and his/her reports of rural migrants' and block people involvement. The leader treatment also leads to an increase in the probability of the migrant reporting the involvement of his/her family in the program, differently from the basic treatment, although this difference is only marginally significant. Seventy percent of migrants in the control group have heard about the program, which is suggestive of contamination of treatment effects to control areas.

Treatment effects on residents and migrants' origin households are less clear. However, we find that the leader treatment increases the probability that residents report rural migrants to be involved in the program, by 4 percentage points (significant at the 10 percent level), and the probability that migrants' origin households report hearing about the program. We find several significant differences between the leader and the basic treatments in the direction of stronger impacts of the leader treatment.

In Table 1 we show treatment effects for outcome variables measuring social interactions with the block leader. The first three outcomes are measured from the leader side: in column (1) we analyze whether the leader reports knowing any migrants in his/her block; in column (2) we consider the percentage of migrants in our sample that the leader recognizes individually; in column (3) we take the number of social groups that the leader reports being a member of. The remaining outcomes considered are for migrants and for residents: whether they know their block leader and whether they contacted him/her since the

²⁰We also include in Appendix Tables G1 to F4, the corresponding tables with fuller details.

previous survey wave. We employ specifications 1 and 3 depending on data availability.

We find systematic effects of the leader treatment on social interactions with the leader. This intervention increases the probability of the leader knowing any migrants in his/her block by 10 percentage points and the proportion of migrants recognized by the leader by 6 percentage points. It also increases leaders' social capital by 0.1 social groups. Migrants are 7 and 4 percentage points more likely to know and to have contacted the leader; the corresponding numbers for the residents are 8 and 6 percentage points. The coefficients of the basic treatment are never significant. Most of the effects of the leader treatment are statistically different from the effects of the basic treatment – the exceptions are for the leader outcomes in columns (1) and (3).

We conclude that the leader treatment was particularly effective to create awareness about the program, namely with its direct participants, i.e., leaders and migrants. This was despite significant awareness about the program in the control blocks. We also report that information about the leader treatment seems to have reached residents and migrants' households at the origin, more strongly than the basic treatment and the control group. Finally, the leader treatment increased systematically the interactions of block leaders with migrants and residents. It also increased leaders' social capital.

5.3 Political effects

We now turn to the political effects of the program. We begin by describing impacts on leader campaigning with special attention to clientelism, as the exchange of favors for political support. Table 7 shows results employing outcome variables from the leader mobilization SCA, in which block leaders were asked to mobilize bicycle taxi drivers for campaigning in favor of the incumbent mayor. In columns (1)-(3) we employ variables on whether leaders report any cyclists mobilized, on number of cyclists reported to be mobilized, and number of cyclists observed by enumerators to be mobilized. In columns (4)-(7), we show outcome variables constructed from survey questions on whether migrants or residents have contacted the block leader (columns 4-5) or paid the block leader (columns 6-7) for a job. We employ the simple specification in 1 for columns (1)-(3) and the stacked specification in 3 including midline and endline survey measures in columns (4)-(7).

We find clear effects of both treatments on leader mobilization of cyclists for campaigning. This is systematic for number of cyclists reported by leaders and observed by enumerators: the magnitudes of the leader treatment effects are 1.7 and 0.7 more cyclists for reports and observations, respectively; these are 1.9 and 0.7 for the basic treatment. All these effects are statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

The effect on the extensive margin of reporting any cyclists is only significant for the leader treatment: this probability increases by 11 percentage points (significant at the 5 percent level). The differences between the two treatments are never significant for these outcomes.

Our measures of contacting or paying the leader for jobs reveal systematic effects of the leader treatment, which is consistent with the clientelistic use of the program, for political purposes. This intervention increased the probability of migrants contacting leaders and of residents contacting/paying leaders by 1 percentage point (at the 1 or 10 percent levels of significance). The basic treatment also increases the probability of migrants contacting leaders for jobs by 1 percentage point; the other effects of this treatment are insignificant. There is only one statistically significant difference between the two treatments: for residents paying leaders for jobs.

In Table 2 we turn to political participation. In columns (1) and (2) we analyze impacts on whether enumerators observed migrants and residents (respectively) holding any political objects when they were interviewed in their homes. In columns (3)-(5) we report treatment effects on our measure of electoral turnout in the 2023 municipal elections as measured by the observation of inked fingers in the two days after the election day. We employ the stacked specification in 3 including midline and endline measures in columns (1)-(2). In columns (3)-(5) we employ the simple specification in 1.

We find that migrants are more likely to hold political objects when faced with both treatment conditions. The magnitudes of these effects are 2 and 3 percentage points for the leader and the basic treatments, both statistically significant at the 1 percent level, not distinguishable from each other. We do not observe significant effects for residents. We note that the additional political objects held by migrants are from both the local incumbent RENAMO and the national ruling party FRELIMO. This is an indication that migrants are mobilized in general for the election: they are likely to be more often accepting political objects from both parties. This is shown in Appendix Table F5.

Electoral turnout as measured by inked fingers increases with the leader treatment for migrants. The magnitude of this effect is 3 percentage points, statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This is over a high 70% rate of electoral participation in the control group. We also find a large point estimate for leaders which is however not significant. This is likely related to the lower statistical power we have with leaders and their 90% rate of electoral participation in the control group. Interestingly, we find a negative point estimate for residents, which is not significant either. This effect is however statistically different from the effect of the basic treatment (at the 5 percent level). The effects of the basic treatment, although positive, are never significant in these regressions.

In Table ??, we show treatment effects on political support for the local incumbent mayor (RENAMO). In column (1) we show results for the stickers SCA, brown version, in which leaders were asked to distribute stickers associating the mayor to the program we study (“Quelimane trabalha com todos”). Column (2) shows results for the version in which migrants and residents in our sample were directly targeted (not through leaders) – the pink version of the stickers. The hanging of these stickers visibly on house doors implies some degree of support for the mayor. The brown version also carries an important clientelistic interpretation as leaders are asking for a public display of support for the mayor after they were involved in the provision of benefits to migrant citizens through the integration program. In columns (3)-(5) we show results on self-reported voting for RENAMO in the 2023 municipal elections for migrants, residents, and migrants’ origin households, respectively. We employ the simple specification in 1 in all regressions of this table.

Brown stickers, i.e., those distributed by the block leaders in their blocks, are more often found hanging on doors of migrants and residents in blocks subject to the leader treatment. The magnitude of this effect is 4 percentage points, significant at the 5 percent level. This effect is significantly different from the one of the basic treatment, which is close to zero. We infer that the leader treatment was effective at increasing support for the mayor through likely clientelism. The effects of the treatments on the hanging of pink stickers, i.e., those distributed directly to migrants and residents, are insignificant. This pattern of results emphasizes the importance of leader influence on political behavior.

We also find some evidence that treatments led to increases in voting for RENAMO in the municipal elections of 2023. We find a positive and significant effect of the basic treatment for migrants, with a 2 percentage-point magnitude, significant at the 10 percent level. This effect is not statistically distinguishable from the effect of the leader treatment. Importantly, the leader treatment increased reported voting for RENAMO by migrants’ households at the origin. This is a large 13 percentage-point effect, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level (also marginally different from the basic treatment). We observe negative point estimate on voting for RENAMO when looking at the residents. This is however statistically insignificant at standard levels.

In the Appendix Table F6, we show some additional results for leaders’ political positions. We find that although there are no treatment effects in the municipal elections of 2023 – as 99% of leaders in the control group report voting for RENAMO –, there are some important treatment effects in 2024 measurements. We find statistically significant differences between the leader and the basic treatments showing that the leader treatment increased the probability that leaders belong to a party, RENAMO in particular. We also

find that both treatments led to higher self-reported support for RENAMO in the presidential elections of October 2024. The other main parties display negative effects (although statistically insignificant).

We conclude that the leader treatment was particularly effective at mobilizing leaders and migrants during the electoral campaign of 2023. We also have evidence that it led to higher electoral participation by migrants and higher public display of support for the mayor. Our pattern of results is consistent with the clientelistic use of the program for political purposes. We also find that the leader treatment had political impacts with the migrants' households at the origin who have reported to vote more often for RENAMO, showing that the city integration program could have regional impacts in political terms.

5.4 Economic effects

In this section, we analyze the economic effects of the migrant integration program we study in our experiment. These can be seen as some relevant mediators for political impacts we uncovered. We begin with Table F7 where we show results on perceptions about migrants' integration in the city. These are based on survey questions asked to block leaders, migrants, and residents, on whether migrants are treated unfairly by community members, and on whether the presence of migrants is positive for the community. Depending on data availability, we employ specifications 1 and 3 including the baseline value of the dependent variable as a control variable (ANCOVA).

We report that leaders become more concerned with migrants being unfairly treated and more positive about the presence of migrants in the community. This is particularly the case for the leader treatment, with magnitudes 9 and 12 percentage points for "migrants unfairly treated" and "migrants are positive" (both significant at the 10 percent level). The basic treatment also increases the probability that leaders find migrants positive for the community (by 11 percentage points, significant at the 10 percent level). It is never statistically distinguishable from the leader treatment. Perhaps surprisingly, we do not find significant treatment effects on these outcome variables for migrants, although point estimates are always positive. Finally, we find a positive impact of the leader treatment on the probability that residents find the presence of migrants positive for the community. The magnitude is 6 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. All other effects for residents are also positively signed, although insignificant.

The central part of the program was job matching for the migrants in the city. For this reason, it is important to analyze the impacts of the treatments on migrants' labor market outcomes. In Table 4 we show treatment effects for migrants on having heard about job offers in the previous 12 months, on having

heard about these offers but through the program “Quelimane trabalha com todos,” on whether migrants are working, on the total number of jobs that they had since the beginning of the project, on the number of hours they working per day, and on the wage they are receiving per week. We employ the stacked specification in 3 including midline and endline survey measures. We include the baseline values of the dependent variable as controls when available.

We first verify that there are clear treatment effects of both program variants on having heard about jobs. The magnitudes of these effects are 7 and 8 percentage points for the leader and basic treatments, respectively. Both are significant at the 1 percent level. When it comes to having heard about job opportunities through the migrant integration program, these effects are 23 and 22 percentage points, also statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Note however that 79% of the migrants in the control group report having heard about these jobs through the program, which implies considerable contamination to the control group.

Turning to employment and wages, we find that the basic treatment decreases the probability of having a job, by 3 percentage points (significant at the 5 percent level). This is not particularly surprising since [Kelley et al. \(2024\)](#) find a similar result from the introduction of a digital job matching platform in India (through increased reservation wages). Consistently, the basic treatment decreases the number of jobs and the number of hours worked by migrants. It also increases their wages. However, these effects are not statistically significant at standard levels. Importantly, the leader treatment produces a different pattern of results. First, it increases the number of hours worked by migrants – the magnitude of this effect is 0.4 hours per day, which is significant at the 1 percent level. Second, it increases significantly the probability of working and the number of jobs of migrants, relative to the basic treatment. For these employment outcome variables, differences to the basic treatment are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This pattern of results shows that the leader treatment was effective at getting migrants to work, relative to the basic version of the intervention.

As part of the program, migrants were introduced to information about mobile money. They were also given small endowments to trial transfers to closest links in the origin household, outside Quelimane. In Table 6 we show treatment effects on the number of mobile money services used by migrants (column 1) as well as migrants’ transfers to the origin and from the origin in the 30 days before the corresponding survey interview, as reported by migrants (columns 2 and 4) and migrants’ origin households (columns 3 and 5). All regressions employ the specification in equation 1, as we only have these data for the midline survey.

We find that both treatments triggered higher mobile money adoption by migrants in terms of number of services used and of transfers from the migrant to the origin household. The number of mobile money services used increased by 0.2 and 0.3 for the leader and basic treatments respectively, with statistical significance varying between 5 and 1 percent. The probability of transferring money from the migrant to the origin household increased by 9 percentage points (as reported by the origin household) for the leader treatment, and by 5-8 percentage points (as reported by the migrant and the origin household) for the basic treatment. These effects are all significant at the 5 percent level. We do not find significant effects of the treatments on the probability that the migrant receives transfers from the corresponding household at the origin (despite systematically positive point estimates). There are no statistically significant differences between treatments on any of the outcome variables considered.

An important outcome of the migrants' integration program is migration. We would expect that if successful, the program would be able to retain existing migrants in Quelimane, and would attract new migrants through the existing ones, namely from their origin households. Table 5 shows treatment effects on migration. In column (1) we look at whether the migrants in our sample are still in Quelimane at the end of the program. In the following columns we analyze the behavior of the surveyed respondents in the migrants' origin households in terms of: intention to move to Quelimane in the following year (column 2), whether they are in Quelimane at the end of the program (column 3), and whether they are in Quelimane approximately one year after the program finished (column 4). We employ specification 3 when considering the data at the midline and endline together (columns 1-3) and specification 1 when considering the phone follow-up in 2024.

We observe that there are no significant treatment effects on retaining existing migrants in Quelimane at the end of the program. This is because, virtually everybody was found in Quelimane at that point (as found for the control group). With regards to migrants' household representative at the origin, we find clear treatment effects of both intervention variants. First, the relatives at the origin are more likely to report an intention to move to Quelimane at the end of the program: the magnitudes of these effects are 4 and 3 percentage points for the leader and basic treatments, respectively (significant at the 1 and 10 percent levels). There are no significant treatment effects on the actual moving to Quelimane of these individuals at that point in time. However, around a year after the intervention finished, we find that these relatives are significantly more likely to have moved to Quelimane: the effect sizes are 5 and 4 percentage points for the leader and the basic treatments (both statistically significant at the 1 percent level). This is evidence that the program was able to promote additional urbanization over and above the integration of

its targeted recent migrants in the city.

We conclude that the leader treatment led to better views about migrants in the city, mainly from leaders but also from residents. It also led to more active participation in the labor market, when compared to the basic treatment. Both treatments caused more transfers to the migrants' origin households and promoted their migration to the city around one year after the program finished. These impacts are consistent with and possibly mediate the political impacts of the leader treatment. Note that RENAMO, the local sponsor of the program but (main) national opposition party, seems to gain from the urbanization process strengthened by the program, which includes additional migration to the city and additional electoral support at the origin.

5.5 Outcome aggregation

In order to address the risks posed by the analysis of multiple outcomes, we now devote attention to aggregating the outcomes we analyzed in detail in the previous sections. We bundle outcomes in indices that are built using the procedure detailed in [Kling et al. \(2007\)](#). We then calculate within-sample z-scores for each individual outcome, employing the mean and the standard deviation of the control group. Subsequently, we obtain the unweighted average z-score for each set of outcomes. The sets of outcomes are aggregated at the level of the figure/table taking into account the same level of observations. [Figure 2](#) shows these treatment effects employing [specification 1](#) and confidence intervals at the 5 percent level of statistical significance. We confirm in these results the main storyline of the paper.

5.6 Other results and robustness

In this section, we report on additional econometric results related to heterogeneous effects and robustness regarding the selection of control variables in our main results employing the Post-double Selection Lasso (PDSL) procedure. These are shown in [Appendix Tables H2 to H6](#) (heterogeneity) and [Appendix Tables I2 to I3](#) (PDSL). Note that when analyzing heterogeneity we focus on our aggregated outcomes as shown in [Figure 2](#).

We find some interesting heterogeneity patterns with regards block leader characteristics. The leader treatment is generally more impactful on migrants and their origin households in terms of their political support for RENAMO when leaders are female. The effects of the leader treatment are generally more effective for older and more experienced leaders, as well as those supporting RENAMO at the baseline.

Some of the treatment effects are driven by blocks with a number of migrants above the median. When considering the results of PDSL, we do not find relevant departures from our main results.

6 Concluding remarks

In this paper, we report on a randomized controlled trial we designed and conducted in the city of Quelimane, Mozambique, to understand the political impacts of an integration program involving the face-to-face coaching of rural migrants as they arrive in the city. Importantly, the program was sponsored by the city government and had the active participation of local leaders; it was centered on job matching with the migrants. This is an innovative policy intervention in a rural country where urbanization opposes the political interests of the ruling party. We find that the version of the program involving local leaders in implementation increased awareness about the program and leaders' contact with migrants and residents. Importantly, we directly observe leaders becoming more mobilized during a municipal electoral campaign, more than one year after the program started. Our evidence is consistent with the use of the program as a tool for clientelism. At the same time, migrants participated more often in the electoral process, namely in terms of voter turnout. Support for the local incumbent increased, including from migrants' households at the origin. The program led to better views about migrants, higher labor market participation, more mobile money transfers to rural areas, and higher rates of migration to the city from migrants' households at the origin one year after the program finished.

We believe the implications of these results for development policy are vast. Urbanization and structural change have been an important part of the typical development path. In countries that still have large majority populations in rural areas, often in poverty pockets around subsistence agriculture, and often in Sub-Saharan Africa, urbanization is needed. Doing it well requires appropriate policies at the central and local levels. In many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, policy at the central level has opposed urbanization (e.g., land rights have been limited). We have shown in this paper that an integration policy sponsored by a city program can be politically interesting from the perspective of local leaders and the opposition party at the national level. We have also confirmed that it is likely uninteresting from the short-term political perspective of the national ruling party. In another perspective, despite the fact that immigrants are often seen as a political problem in many settings around the world, we can infer from our results that it is politically viable for cities in countries like Mozambique to support the integration of rural migrants. City government policy can then be explored as an important channel to target optimal rates of urbanization

while influencing the quality of the integration of rural migrants in the cities. We conclude that development and structural change have a chance when politics and policy are aligned, feasibly at the local level, with regards to promoting urbanization.

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
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
7 Figures

Figure 1: Who is involved in the program?



Note: Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3 (stacked regressions). The top panel presents results for the block leaders; the second panel presents results for the sampled migrants; the third panel presents results for the sampled residents; the bottom panel presents results for the sampled district relatives. Dependent variables: (1) *Heard about program*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard about the program “Quelimane trabalha com todos”, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Self*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have been involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Family*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that his/her family was involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Block people*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that people living in the same block were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Rural migrants*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that rural migrants were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table E1. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 2: Outcome aggregation



Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3. The confidence intervals are built using statistical significance at the 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at the block level in regressions with observations at a lower level. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped by table in indices built using the Kling et al. (2007) procedure. Outcomes are first normalized in standardized units (using the mean and standard deviation of the control group), and then averaged within each category.

8 Tables

Table 1: Interaction with block leader

	Leader knows block migrants		Knows leader		Contacted leader		Resorted to leader for job	
	General (1)	% sampled (2)	Migrant (3)	Resident (4)	Migrant (5)	Resident (6)	Migrant (7)	Resident (8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.095** (0.038)	0.058*** (0.017)	0.066** (0.026)	0.080* (0.045)	0.041*** (0.010)	0.055*** (0.021)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.017** (0.007)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.043 (0.039)	0.003 (0.019)	-0.037 (0.028)	-0.037 (0.044)	0.008 (0.010)	0.005 (0.022)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.006)
Observations	812	859	2849	745	6105	1575	6079	1567
R ²	0.280	0.317	0.291	0.390	0.085	0.193	0.040	0.152
Mean (control group)	0.682	0.159	0.543	0.580	0.097	0.165	0.011	0.007
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.147	0.005	0.000	0.008	0.002	0.020	0.499	0.084
Outcome data	Pooled	Pooled	Midline	Midline	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Sharpened q-value TL	0.011	0.003	0.011	0.019	0.001	0.011	0.003	0.012
Sharpened q-value TB	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.066	1.000

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1)-(3) as well as (6)-(7) use equation 3, employing midline and endline surveys (stacked regressions). Columns (4) and (5) use equation 1 and include only data from the first post-baseline survey wave. We did not collect the lagged values for any of the dependent variables. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Leader knows block migrants – General*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent knows any rural migrants living in the same block, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Leader knows block migrants – % sampled*: variable ranging from 0 to 1 indicating the percentage of rural migrants that the respondent selects from the list of migrants sampled in the same block; (3) *Social capital*: total number of social groups for which the respondent reports membership; (4)-(5) *Knows leader*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent correctly identifies the name of the current leader in the same block, and 0 otherwise; (6)-(7) *Contacted leader*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have approached the block leader at least once since the previous survey waves, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table E2. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2: Political participation

	Party objects observed		Electoral turnout: inked finger		
	Migrant (1)	Resident (2)	Leader (3)	Migrant (4)	Resident (5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.017*** (0.006)	0.005 (0.015)	0.051 (0.035)	0.030* (0.017)	-0.053 (0.035)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.026*** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.031 (0.034)	0.019 (0.017)	0.020 (0.034)
Observations	6103	1572	399	3322	807
R ²	0.075	0.149	0.347	0.130	0.243
Mean (control group)	0.046	0.083	0.896	0.697	0.825
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.147	0.553	0.557	0.533	0.032
Outcome data	Pooled	Pooled	Election	Election	Election
Sharpened q-value TL	0.031	0.231	0.177	0.177	0.177
Sharpened q-value TB	0.001	1.000	0.924	0.924	1.000

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1)-(2) use equation 3, employing the midline and endline (stacked regressions). Columns (3)-(5) use equation 1 and present results for outcomes collected in the two days following the 2023 local elections in Mozambique. We did not collect the lagged values for any of the dependent variables. Columns (1) and (4) present results for migrants; columns (2) and (5) present results for residents; column (3) presents results for block leaders. Dependent variable by column: (1)-(2) *Party objects observed*: variable equal to 1 if the enumerator identified any objects with a political content held by the respondent, and 0 otherwise; (3)-(5) *Electoral turnout: inked finger*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent's finger was marked with purple ink during the enumerators' visit in the two days after the 2023 local elections in Mozambique, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table E4. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3: Political support for the local incumbent

	Leader mobilization		Stickers		Self-reported voting RENAMO		
	Reports cyclists (1)	Observed # mobilized (2)	From leader (brown) (3)	From field team (pink) (4)	Migrant (5)	Resident (6)	Dist. relative (7)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.112** (0.053)	0.709* (0.395)	0.038** (0.017)	0.000 (0.046)	0.002 (0.014)	-0.047 (0.040)	0.128* (0.071)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.077 (0.053)	0.662* (0.393)	-0.007 (0.019)	0.023 (0.056)	0.024* (0.014)	-0.039 (0.040)	0.009 (0.075)
Observations	429	429	429	429	2084	530	418
R^2	0.451	0.402	0.821	0.679	0.105	0.383	0.394
Mean (control group)	0.629	1.490	0.436	0.745	0.911	0.851	0.539
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.509	0.917	0.020	0.645	0.126	0.842	0.094
Sharpened q-value TL	0.139	0.139	0.139	0.492	0.492	0.165	0.139
Sharpened q-value TB	0.533	0.533	0.856	0.856	0.533	0.541	1.000

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1)-(3) use equation 1 and include only data from the endline. Columns (4)-(7) use equation 3, employing the midline and endline survey waves (stacked regressions). We did not collect the lagged values for any of the dependent variables. Columns (1)-(3) show results for the block leader; columns (4) and (6) show results for migrants; columns (5) and (7) show results for residents. Dependent variables by columns: (1) *Reports cyclists*: variable equal to 1 if the list left with leaders for cyclist mobilization contains any names at the time of collection, and 0 otherwise; (2) *# cyclists reported*: variable counting the number of cyclists included on the list left with the leaders at the time of collection; (3) *Observed # mobilized*: variable counting the number of cyclists mobilized by leaders that attended the second visit by enumerators; (4)-(5) *“In the last year have you contacted the leader for a job?”*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having approached the block leader to ask for employment in the previous year, and 0 otherwise; (6)-(7) *“In the last year have you paid the leader for a job?”*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having paid the block leader for employment in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table E3. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4: Labor market outcomes - migrants

	Heard of job (1)	Heard of job through program (2)	Working (3)	# jobs (4)	# hours working (5)	Wage (6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.070*** (0.014)	0.226*** (0.030)	0.020 (0.016)	0.028 (0.018)	0.419*** (0.156)	0.000 (0.036)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.082*** (0.014)	0.220*** (0.030)	-0.032** (0.016)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.147 (0.167)	0.032 (0.031)
Observations	6105	1714	6100	6100	6105	4704
R ²	0.189	0.301	0.185	0.165	0.149	0.078
Mean (control group)	0.233	0.476	0.625	0.702	4.518	-0.002
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.398	0.790	0.001	0.008	0.000	0.366
Outcome data	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Sharpened q-value TL	0.001	0.001	0.133	0.103	0.010	0.305
Sharpened q-value TB	0.001	0.001	0.064	0.220	0.234	0.220

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3. All columns combine the midline and endline surveys (stacked regressions). Columns (3) and (6) include the lagged value of the dependent variable. We did not collect the lagged values of the remaining dependent variables. All outcomes presented are concerning migrants. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Heard of job*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard of a job offer in the 12 months before the interview date, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Heard of job through program*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent heard of a job offer through the migrants' integration program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Working*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent was employed at the time of the interview, and 0 otherwise; (4) *# jobs*: number of jobs that the respondent reports having had since the beginning of the project; (5) *# hours working*: variable reporting the number of hours that the respondent reports having worked on the day before the interview date; (6) *Wage*: variable with the standardized value of the reported wage per week. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table E7. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5: Migration

	Migrants		Dist. relatives	
	Moved back to district (1)	Likely to move (2)	In Quelimane (3)	In Quelimane (4)
(TL) Leader treatment	-0.005 (0.008)	0.039*** (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.046*** (0.014)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.013* (0.008)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.020 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)
Observations	3579	3724	1488	2313
R ²	0.092	0.072	0.106	0.081
Mean (control group)	0.046	0.114	0.056	0.089
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.294	0.297	0.043	0.479
Outcome data	Endline	Pooled	Endline	Follow-up I
Sharpened q-value TL	0.484	0.011	0.532	0.004
Sharpened q-value TB	0.087	0.087	0.108	0.027

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1)-(3) use equation 3, combining the mid-line and endline surveys (stacked regressions). Column (4) presents results for data collected in the first follow-up phone survey, around one year after the program finished. We did not collect the lagged values of the remaining dependent variables. Column (1) presents results for migrants; columns (2)-(4) present results for district relatives. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Moved back to district*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reported having moved back to the origin district at the time of the interview, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Likely to move*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports being likely or very like to move to Quelimane within the following 12 months, and 0 otherwise (3)-(4) *In Quelimane*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports living in Quelimane at the time of the interview, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table ???. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: Mobile money

	# services used	Transfers to district reported by		Transfers to migrant reported by	
	Migrants (1)	Migrant (2)	Dist. relative (3)	Migrant (4)	Dist. relative (5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.193** (0.095)	0.018 (0.020)	0.085** (0.040)	0.020 (0.015)	0.023 (0.043)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.278*** (0.097)	0.050** (0.021)	0.082** (0.039)	0.021 (0.016)	0.056 (0.041)
Observations	2855	2855	982	2855	978
R^2	0.213	0.124	0.185	0.101	0.213
Mean (control group)	2.539	0.242	0.415	0.114	0.485
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.385	0.125	0.929	0.936	0.447
Sharpened q-value TL	0.114	0.462	0.114	0.378	0.234
Sharpened q-value TB	0.042	0.082	0.023	0.034	0.082

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. All outcomes were collected in the midline survey. We did not collect lagged values of any of the presented variables. Columns (1)-(2) and (4) display results for migrants; columns (3) and (5) display results for district relatives. Dependent variables by column: (1) *# services used*: variable summing the total number of mobile money services that the respondent reports using from the list of all available services; (2) *Transfers to district reported by migrant*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having sent mobile money transfers to a relative living in their origin district in the 30 days before the interview date, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Transfers to district reported by dist. relative*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having received mobile money transfers from a relative living in Quelimane in the 30 days before the interview date, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Transfers to migrant reported by migrant*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having received mobile money transfers from a relative living in their origin district in the 30 days before the interview date, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Transfers to migrant reported by dist. relative*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having sent mobile money transfers to a relative living in Quelimane in the 30 days before the interview date, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are in the Appendix in Table E8. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

8.1 Trials

Table 7: Campaigning and clientelism

	Leader mobilization			"In the last year have you reached the leader for a job?"	
	Reports cyclists (1)	# cyclists reported (2)	Observed # mobilized (3)	Migrant (4)	Resident (5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.112** (0.053)	1.699* (0.969)	0.709* (0.395)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.017** (0.007)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.077 (0.053)	1.850* (1.002)	0.662* (0.393)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.006)
Observations	429	429	429	6079	1567
R ²	0.451	0.516	0.402	0.040	0.152
Mean (control group)	0.629	7.182	1.490	0.011	0.007
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.509	0.877	0.917	0.499	0.084
Outcome data	Endline	Endline	Endline	Pooled	Pooled
Sharpened q-value TL	0.042	0.051	0.051	0.003	0.034
Sharpened q-value TB	0.177	0.141	0.141	0.040	0.232

Table 8: Views about migrants' integration

	Migrants unfairly treated			Migrants are positive		
	Leader (1)	Migrant (2)	Resident (3)	Leader (4)	Migrant (5)	Resident (6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.121* (0.071)	0.023 (0.023)	0.009 (0.030)	0.150* (0.090)	-0.033 (0.027)	0.058 (0.047)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.026 (0.071)	0.030 (0.024)	0.034 (0.028)	0.127 (0.098)	-0.030 (0.029)	0.037 (0.048)
Observations	339	3568	1492	347	5948	1537
R ²	0.423	0.127	0.166	0.409	0.099	0.190
Mean (control group)	0.161	0.317	0.215	2.397	2.336	2.328
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.056	0.773	0.436	0.801	0.926	0.643
Outcome data	Midline	Pooled	Pooled	Midline	Pooled	Pooled
Sharpened q-value TL	0.418	0.418	0.509	0.418	0.418	0.418
Sharpened q-value TB	0.752	0.752	0.752	0.752	0.752	0.752

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1) and (4) use equation 1, and include data from the midline survey. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) use equation 3, employing the midline and endline surveys (stacked regressions). Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) include the lagged value of the dependent variable as a control. We did not collect the lagged values for columns (1) and (4). Columns (1) and (4) show results for block leaders; columns (2) and (5) show results for migrants; columns (3) and (6) show results for residents. Dependent variables by column: (1)-(3) *Migrants treated unfairly*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that migrants are frequently or very frequently treated unfairly by community members, and 0 otherwise; (4)-(6) *Migrants are positive*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement that migrants are positive for the community, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table E6. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

ONLINE APPENDIX

Supplementary material to

On the Political Economy of Urbanization: Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

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A Treatment contents

The program aiming to integrate recent rural migrants in the city of Quelimane, Mozambique, was labeled ‘Quelimane trabalha com todos’ (Quelimane works with everybody). Its targets were recent rural migrants who became residents of the city in the 12 months prior to our first visits. The program consisted of individual coaching sessions through five house visits to migrants, entailing a one hour of face-to-face conversation per visit, divided into three strands, which we describe in further detail below. See Appendix Figure C1 for the specific timing of the five rounds of home visits. In the main variation of the program, its delivery was mediated by the block leader in the targeted block.

Table A1: Number of rounds by treatment

	Mean (1)	S.E. (2)	Min (3)	Max (4)	N (5)
Control	0.00	0.00	0	0	1567
T1	2.63	1.76	0	5	1494
T2	2.55	1.74	0	5	1567

Table A2: Number of rounds by treatment

	Round 1 (1)	Round 2 (2)	Round 3 (3)	Round 4 (4)	Round 5 (5)
Control	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
T1	0.20 (0.40)	0.55 (0.50)	0.58 (0.49)	0.57 (0.49)	0.72 (0.45)
T2	0.20 (0.40)	0.54 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.72 (0.45)
Observations	4628	4628	4628	4628	4628

A.1 Administrative information

Throughout the five home visits to migrants, the conversation was initiated with a module providing practical administrative information about the city. This was intended as a general introduction to living

in the city. Importantly, it gave information on how to become a registered resident in the city. In the first two visits, the module consisted of a presentation developed by the municipality. It included information on the administrative divisions and political context of the city, the locations where a citizen card and residence documentation could be obtained, the timing and locations for electoral registration as well as details of the voting process, details of schooling and healthcare in the city, and a description of some of the city's cultural traditions. By the third visit, the same content was provided but the presentation was incorporated into the survey platform and turned into an interactive experience in the form of a quiz: respondents were first asked to guess based on the two prior visits and then were given the true answer. Figure [A1](#) and figure [A2](#) summarize the information presented.

Figure A1: Presentation on administrative information

e Visão de Quelimane

Visão

Nossa visão é construir uma cidade Próspera, Social, Ambientalmente Saudável, Sustentável e Resiliente, com uma economia dinâmica & verde"

Desenvolvimento Social

Desenvolvimento de Infraestrutura

Mudanças Climáticas e Resiliência

Económico Desenvolvimento

Desenvolvimento agrícola

Missão

- Uma cidade rejuvenescida de Quelimane centro económico e agrícola da província
- Uma cidade que é um modelo nacional, ambientalmente amigável e se esforça p resiliência.
- Uma cidade que é o capital eco Município
- Uma sociedade aberta e base oportunidades, onde jovens, adquirentes e crianças tenham opo equitativas.
- Uma cidade onde todos são livre e independentemente do seu cor, sexo ou socioeconómica ou ideologia política
- Uma cidade onde as pessoas desfrutar vida digna e podem concretizar os seus s

Etil / Nova Era para Quelimane




Planes da Estratégia do Etal Manual de Apoio para rejuvenescer Quelimane

- Desenvolvimento Social
- Desenvolvimento de Infraestrutura
- Mudanças Climáticas e Resiliência
- Desenvolvimento Económico
- Desenvolvimento agrícola

Quelimane, "governado pelo povo" poder após o independento por cerca onor", estive em completa decadência. Infraestruturas como a estrada abandonada utilizada por crianças sem dar superecido fecho, e o r inundadas, devido à proximidade da cidade para com o faz de um rio, e do atavos dos lençóis fêdicos. Desde a bela Manual de Apoio como Etal em data 2011, **começou a notar-se mudanças** Manuel De Apoio, trabalha em colaboração com o seu povo, a fim m se envolver no melhoramento do cidã si memora, e as mudanças os encc começar a pagar impostos.

ELIMANE 2030: ROTEIRO DA VISÃO

le Próspera, Social, Ambientalmente Saudável, Sustentável, e Resiliente, com uma Economia Dinâmica & Verde"



Relatório de Julho 2

gráfica de Quelimane

A população em Quelimane aumentou de 150,000 em 1997 para 350,000 em 2017, um indicador de crescimento populacional significativo, que gera o necessário desenvolvimento espacial e planeamento fundamental.

População Total: 342,842

Mulheres: 181,216 Homens: 168,626



Localização de Quelimane




Quelimane, está localizada no rio "Bans Shas", cerca de 20 km do Oceano Índico, na foz sudeste do Zambeze, a 6 km do costa, na foz do rio "Bans Shas". A cidade de Quelimane tem uma área de 117 km2.

Planes para Quelimane 2030

Planes de Desenvolvimento (Plano da Eficiência)

- Desenvolvimento Social
- Desenvolvimento de Infraestrutura
- Mudanças Climáticas e Resiliência
- Desenvolvimento Económico
- Desenvolvimento agrícola

Conteúdo físico, Conteúdo institucional, Conteúdo social, Conteúdo económico

Relatório para Quelimane 2030

Atividade em Quelimane

Cidade em desenvolvimento – é fal o nível do Gabinete do Espado do Etal, através de procceda para o educar, criar, corrigir e apoiar para crianças, cometei e apoio para o Program de distribuição de aulas nos escolas de Quelimane. A Biblioteca edificou duas novas bibliotecas nos postos administrativos, mas equis 3 adicionais garantir o acesso à internet e material de leitura. As bibliotecas estão equipadas com computadores e Internet desenvolvimento Ingagem e distribuição. As bibliotecas também se vem da Internet.



Serviços em Quelimane

Hospital De Ickida

O hospital de Ickida está localizado no posto administrativo N°2, no bairro de Ickida. Telefone: +258 840567297

Hospital Central de Quelimane

O hospital central de Quelimane está localizado no posto administrativo N°5, no bairro Noroninho. Telefone: +258 8491 0322

Centro Médico Santa Vici

Victoria está localizado no posto administrativo N°1, no bairro Iberidade. Telefone: +258 857000700

Comunidade em Quelimane

Quelimane tem uma comunidade culturalmente diversificada, com influências de uma variedade de culturas e religiões, que vão desde os seus rotas africanas ao seu passado colonial, e os dignos vizinhos do Médio Oriente. Esta diversidade e prosperidade Cultural é celebrada anualmente, com o **Carnaval**, através do **Danças tradicionais e Económica**.

No Cidade de Quelimane, proximamente utilizados para passeios e bens. Bicicleta componi uma alternativa ao transporte público, uma vez que a Autoridade dispõe destes serviços. Bem equipado, o ciclismo é um dos principais meios de transporte público em Quelimane, com mais de 500 participantes.



Figure A2: Presentation on administrative information

Infraestrutura de Estradas e Pontes de Quelimane

A vasta rede rodoviária internacional que conecta Quelimane a cidades como Bnamwe, Horare, Tale e Namputa, garante o futuro para o comércio e intercâmbio regional. No entanto, pouco foi feito para desbloquear estas oportunidades. Pontes e ferries são comumente usados para atravessar rios. No entanto, os danos causados pelas inundações dificultam estes meios de travessia tornando-os inseguros.

Aeroporto de Quelimane

Aeroporto tem se tornado centros e catalisadores vitais para o crescimento económico. Em centros de acesso para o resto do mundo. O Aeroporto de Quelimane desbloqueia o acesso mundial. Apesar de atualmente não ser um aeroporto internacional, investimento e comércio desbloquear o seu potencial como um aeroporto de cargas e passageiros. Quelimane tem o vantagem de uma boa rede de estradas, ligando a outros grandes cidades do país. adjacentes. A localização próxima do aeroporto deve ser visto como uma grande vantagem competitiva para Quelimane.

Patrimónios históricos de Quelimane

Criada por missionários portugueses na década de 1770 e 80, a Catedral foi nomeada um monumento nacional em 1983. Com o colapso da Diocese de Quelimane em 1984, que foi elevada para estatuto de catedral, este monumento é uma grande atracção turística.

Opções Cidade Inteligente (Smart City) - CRIAR UMA CIDADE VERDE

Reciclado

Energia solar

Emissão de carbono reduzido

Porto Regional em Quelimane

Quelimane tem um porto de pesca moderno e um Doca Seca. Quelimane possui ainda um porto comercial estrategicamente localizada. O porto pode, politicamente, facilitar a importação e exportação de produtos, e pode servir economicamente a produção e os países vizinhos (Moçambique, Zâmbia, Malávia, República Democrática do Congo), reduzindo os custos de transporte. O porto de Quelimane é facilmente acessível a partir de Bnamwe, com 466 km de estrada asfaltada. A localização geográfica de Quelimane permite várias oportunidades comerciais regionais, que atualmente são subutilizadas no região da Zâmbia e região vizinha internacional, especialmente pelos países do interior através do seu Porto.

Infraestrutura de Transporte Ferroviário e Fluvial de Quelimane

Infraestrutura Fluvial
O rio dos bairros, tem um potencial, através de projetos de irrigação e manutenção, para conectar-se ao rio Zambeze. Esta conexão pode ser usada para o transporte de produtos agrícolas de milhares de pessoas que vivem em comunidades dispersas ao rio Zambeze, ou podem ser usadas para o comércio, ou mesmo para o turismo.

Infraestrutura Ferroviária
O Ministério moçambicano dos Transportes e Comunicações (MTC) anunciou que tem a intenção de lançar o projeto para construir o ferrolho Cahitimo - Mocim, entre as províncias Tale e Zâmbia. Vivei em 2017, a restauração do linha ferroviária Quelimane Mocim é muito importante para o desenvolvimento económico da região.

Portos e Infraestrutura Municipal
Localmente, dentro distritos, existem várias estruturas, princípios de obras que necessitam de atenção imediata. Tal são vias de estradas para o coleta local e distribuição regional das pessoas e bens. Algumas pontas principais requerem regularizações de medidas de sustentabilidade.

Redes Sociais de Quelimane

Informações de contacto da Autoria de Quelimane

Opções Cidade Inteligente (Smart City) - CRIAR UMA CIDADE CONECTADA

Presença em Redes Sociais

Website da cidade

WiFi ao meu Hotspot

Opções Cidade Inteligente (Smart City) - CRIAR UMA CIDADE AMIGADA DO CLIMA

"Precisamos que os investidores estrangeiros criem uma infraestrutura dedicada."

Como presidente de uma Autoria da África, é mais fácil conseguir dinheiro para construir estradas para carros do que construir 2 metros de elevador."

Manuel M. M. M. M.


Faixas dedicadas a pedestres e ciclistas

Infraestruturas para pedestres (banco, coberto de teto)


Cursos económicos (bicicleta, trotinete)

A.2 Job matching


Figure A3: CENSUS - Round 1



(a) Doors knocked




(b) Doors answered




(c) Job offers


Figure A4: CENSUS - Round 3



(a) Doors knocked



(b) Doors answered



(c) Job offers

Table A3: Jobs found

	Round 1		Round 2		Round 3		Round 4		Round 5		Total	
	Mean / (SD)	N	Mean / (SD)	N	Mean / (SD)	N	Mean / (SD)	N	Mean / (SD)	N	Mean / (SD)	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Farming & cattle / fishing	0.16 (0.37)	80	0.01 (0.09)	8	0.16 (0.36)	65	0.15 (0.36)	48	0.10 (0.30)	21	0.09 (0.29)	222
Construction	0.14 (0.35)	70	0.01 (0.08)	6	0.15 (0.36)	62	0.13 (0.33)	39	0.85 (0.36)	996	0.35 (0.48)	1173
Domestic worker	0.58 (0.49)	290	0.04 (0.20)	39	0.54 (0.50)	224	0.44 (0.50)	138	0.53 (0.50)	110	0.34 (0.47)	801
Merchant	0.04 (0.19)	19	0.01 (0.10)	10	0.04 (0.20)	18	0.05 (0.22)	16	0.06 (0.23)	12	0.03 (0.17)	75
Guard	0.07 (0.25)	33	. (.)	0	0.04 (0.19)	15	0.03 (0.16)	8	0.08 (0.27)	16	0.05 (0.22)	72
Chofer	0.01 (0.09)	4	0.00 (0.03)	1	0.02 (0.13)	7	0.00 (0.06)	1	0.03 (0.17)	6	0.01 (0.09)	19
Office work	0.01 (0.10)	5	0.00 (0.00)	0	0.01 (0.12)	6	0.01 (0.11)	4	0.00 (0.07)	1	0.01 (0.08)	16
Assistant to mechanic	0.01 (0.11)	6	. (.)	0	0.02 (0.15)	10	0.01 (0.10)	3	0.01 (0.12)	3	0.02 (0.12)	22
Sewer	0.00 (0.06)	2	. (.)	0	0.01 (0.10)	4	0.01 (0.10)	3	0.00 (0.07)	1	0.01 (0.08)	10
Barber/Hairdresser	0.01 (0.12)	7	0.00 (0.00)	0	0.02 (0.15)	9	0.02 (0.14)	6	0.02 (0.14)	4	0.01 (0.10)	26
Mobile money agent	0.00 (0.04)	1	. (.)	0	. (.)	0	. (.)	0	. (.)	0	0.00 (0.04)	1
Handyman	0.02 (0.13)	9	0.00 (0.05)	2	0.02 (0.13)	7	0.01 (0.11)	4	0.03 (0.17)	6	0.01 (0.11)	28
Docker	0.00 (0.06)	2	. (.)	0	. (.)	0	. (.)	0	. (.)	0	0.00 (0.06)	2
Shoemaker	0.00 (0.04)	1	. (.)	0	0.00 (0.07)	2	. (.)	0	0.00 (0.07)	1	0.00 (0.06)	4
Adman	0.02 (0.45)	11	. (.)	0	0.00 (0.05)	1	1.00 (.)	1	. (.)	0	0.01 (0.34)	13
Services	. (.)	0	. (.)	0	. (.)	0	1.00 (0.00)	2	0.00 (0.07)	1	0.01 (0.12)	3
Attempt		69150		952		33094		1462		1171		
Answered		36227		952		26660		1403		983		
Hiring		499		149		416		310		208		

The center and main part of the conversation in the five face-to-face home visits to migrants was about job matching. Program participants were allocated contacts (name and phone number) of potential job offers. To collect the information relating to these job offers, we conducted two censuses of job offers suitable to rural migrants having recently arrived in the city, in which we visited every house and establishment in the city. Figures A3 and A4 map all the attempted establishments/houses, the ones where we got answers and the ones where we actually found employees for rounds 1 and 3, respectively. Additionally, we conducted three rounds of job updating by phone with the previously collected contacts, just before each round of treatment as in the timeline of Appendix Figure C1. We managed to identify 1582 job offers during this project, mostly for housekeeping, babysitting, cleaning, and gardening. Table A3 provides descriptive statistics on the jobs collected for each round. Program implementers allocated these jobs to specific migrants based on the elicitation of the migrants' job preferences. During the first round, field administrators were allocating three contacts for each person. Given the low success reported anecdotally, for the second round we decided to increase this number to seven contacts per migrant. By the third round, and from then on, we were allocating 10 job contacts to each participant. In the last two visits, the implementer was also linking each potential employer and migrant by contacting the employer during the house visit and setting an interview date. As a final step of all visits, implementers always sent a text message to each migrant with the potential employers' contacts. To further enhance treatment adherence, during the fourth round we included video of a recently arrived migrant describing a successful experience with the program. Two similar videos with a female and a male migrants were filmed. The survey then followed a deterministic algorithm to randomly determine on the spot which of the two versions of the video to exhibit. Figure A5 depicts the script followed for the videos, and figure ?? illustrates the two videos.

Figure A5: Script for migrants' video

Video script migrants – Round 4

Good morning/afternoon,

My name is {name}, and I was born in {district}. I moved to Quelimane in {year} for {work/visit family/illness,...}.

In September 2021, I joined the NOVAFRICA integration program in collaboration with the Quelimane Municipality. Since then, I have received three home visits from the program team.

During these visits, I was given contacts of people potentially looking for an employer. However, the first number I called didn't go through, and the second person said they didn't have time to talk. This made me start doubting the program.

By the third visit, I had received a new list with 10 contacts, so I decided to keep trying. I started calling the numbers one by one. The third person I reached finally picked up, but the job was no longer available—same with the fourth. Finally, with the fifth and seventh contacts, I was able to schedule short interviews. Both were for positions as a {occupation}. In each interview, I introduced myself, explained my qualifications and conditions, and one of them gave me the opportunity to start on a trial basis. It went well.

Today, thanks to the program, I am still employed as a {occupation}. I also have additional contacts to explore in the future if needed, but for now, I am happy where I am.

The key takeaway is that the "Quelimane works with everyone!" program truly works—you just need to be persistent. There are jobs and opportunities in the city for everyone. Keep trying!




Figure A6: Migrant video (Man)




Figure A7: Migrant video (Woman)

A.3 Mobile Money

The third component of each of the five house visits introduced migrants to mobile money. Program implementers shared a presentation on Mozambique's leading mobile money service (M-PESA). It included information on how to open an account, cash-in and cash-out electronic money, as well as to make transfers. In the third round of the visits, participants were given 20 Meticais (around 0.3 USD) to cash-in and transfer to a rural family member. It served the purpose of incentivizing the opening of accounts for those not holding one, and trialing transfers to the migrants' origin household using mobile money.

Figure A8: Presentation on mobile money

É fácil usar o M-Pesa

Como transferir dinheiro para um número de celular?

Como transferir dinheiro entre o M-Pesa e Bancos?

Tarifário

Tipo de transação	Valor (MT)	Taxa (MT)
Transferir dinheiro para Cliente	De 100 a 1000	8
	De 1001 a 10000	20
	De 10001 a 100000	40
	De 100001 a 1000000	60
	De 1000001 a 2500000	120
Levantar dinheiro para Cliente	De 100 a 1000	20
	De 1001 a 5000	40

O que é o M-Pesa?

Como transferir dinheiro entre o M-Pesa e Bancos?

Tarifário

Tipo de transação	Valor (MT)	Taxa (MT)
Transferir dinheiro para Cliente	De 100 a 1000	80
	De 1001 a 10000	100
	De 10001 a 100000	150
	De 100001 a 1000000	200
	De 1000001 a 2500000	300
Levantar dinheiro para Cliente	De 20 a 25000	0,41%
	De 25000 a 250000	0,41%
Pagos em Comércio incluindo POS	De 100 a 1000	2% do Valor da Transação
	De 1001 a 2000	2%
Pagos passivos (DM)	De 10 a 100	2%
	De 101 a 200	2%
Compras Credenciadas	De 10 a 100	2%
	De 101 a 200	2%

Como abrir uma Conta?

Como levantar dinheiro no Agente M-Pesa?

Tarifário

Tipo de transação	Valor (MT)	Taxa (MT)
Reservar com sucesso por erro de	De 100 a 25000	90
	De 25000 a 250000	100
Pagos em Comércio (M-Pesa, TV, Jogo, etc)	De 100 a 25000	0,41%
	De 25000 a 250000	0,41%
Recarregar dinheiro para Cliente	De 100 a 25000	0,41%
	De 25000 a 250000	0,41%
Transferir dinheiro para Cliente	De 100 a 25000	0,41%
	De 25000 a 250000	0,41%
Transferir dinheiro para Cliente	De 100 a 25000	0,41%
	De 25000 a 250000	0,41%

Como depositar Dinheiro?

Tarifário

Tipo de transação	Valor (MT)	Taxa (MT)
Depositar dinheiro	De 30 a 25000	0,41%
	De 25000 a 50000	0,41%
	De 50000 a 100000	0,41%
	De 100000 a 200000	0,41%
	De 200000 a 500000	0,41%

Facilita a tua vida

A.4 Block leaders

One of the two versions of the program contained the explicit support and active participation of the block leaders (within their corresponding block). In each round of visits in the leader treatment the field team initiated the conversations with migrants by showing a video on tablets with a short message from the corresponding block leader, who expressed clear support for the program and incentivized migrants to follow the instructions and advice of the program implementers. At the end of each visit, implementers reminded migrants about the leader's name and contact information to enable reaching him/her in case of necessity. The field team also sent a text message with the same information after the visit. Block leaders were encouraged to be present in all rounds of face-to-face contact with the migrants. However their presence was only systematic in the fifth visit when they all participated in the house visits belonging to their corresponding blocks alongside the field team. We note that in the fourth round all leaders were asked to emphasize the relevance of participating in elections when speaking in the video that was shown in the face-to-face visits to migrants. The content and framing of such message was left at their discretion, with most leaders delivering a political message related to the approaching municipal elections of 2023. We display a frame from one of these videos in Figure A10.

77.16% of leaders attended the visits during the 5th round.

Figure A9: Leader protocol - Round 4

Round 4 – Leader script

Hi, my name is \${enum_name}, and I'm a member of the NOVAFRICA team. As you know, we have been working with the Municipality for some time to implement a program aimed at integrating recent rural migrants into the community.

We believe that by fostering a more dignified life and ensuring better integration for migrants, we are contributing to the overall development of the city. Your support has been invaluable in promoting this initiative, and today, we're here once again to ask for your cooperation.

We came to you last year to ask you to shoot a video promoting and supporting our program to integrate rural migrants in Quelimane. Today we return to shoot one more video with similar content. The idea is, once again, to promote our program and build momentum for this final round. The program aims to have a positive impact on the block's life and the Municipality in general, and since you as the leader are someone important to the community, we are certain you are key in getting the migrants to join our program. At the same time, the local elections will take place in September, this year, so you can take this opportunity to remind migrants of the importance of voting in elections. It is also a good opportunity to show migrants how the Municipality has policies that help the community and the well-being of its citizens.

In summary, we ask you to mention three topics in this video:

- Your perception of how this program matters for integrating rural migrants into the community;*
- How the program is advocated by the Municipality;*
- How important it is for everyone to participate in the 2023 local elections.*

We ask you to make a short recording of about 3/4 minutes. Are you ready to record?

Figure A10: Video of block leader



B Sampling and randomization

The program studied in this paper was tailored to rural migrants who had recently arrived in Quelimane. With this in mind, recent migrants were our primary sampling unit. We looked for a representative sample of the population of households containing at least one recent migrant. We display the map of Quelimane in Figure B1 with the distribution of migrants at the baseline, following the first wave of recruitment of migrants, in each block of the city.

Randomization was performed within strata of up to three blocks. The following variables were used to compute the stratification metric:

- Neighborhood: Administrative division defined by the municipality. The city encompasses 54 neighborhoods, each one divided in blocks.
- Number of migrants per block: only migrants sampled in the first wave of baseline recruitment of migrants were accounted for stratification.

The same migrants and residents sampled at the baseline were re-interviewed at midline and at endline, with no allowed substitutions. We found 79% and 75% of the migrants' and residents' sample at midline, respectively; and 90% and 74% of the migrants' and residents' samples at endline. Some blocks changed leaders between survey waves. In such blocks, we interviewed both the former and the new leader at midline but show results only for the latter. At endline, only the leaders in office at that point were interviewed. We test whether there were significant differences in attrition across treatment arms and find, reassuringly, that this is not the case. Results for attrition can be found in Table B1.

Figure B1: Number of migrants sampled at baseline in each block




Figure B2: Sample distribution by treatment group across the city




Figure B3: Sampling




Table B1: Attrition by sample type

	Midline				Endline			
	Leaders (1)	Migrants (2)	Residents (3)	Relatives (4)	Leaders (5)	Migrants (6)	Residents (7)	Relatives (8)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.000 (0.039)	-0.016 (0.021)	0.039 (0.034)	0.014 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.022)	0.002 (0.012)	0.018 (0.029)	0.016 (0.013)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.029 (0.040)	-0.014 (0.020)	0.033 (0.034)	0.032 (0.025)	-0.020 (0.019)	0.000 (0.011)	0.005 (0.031)	0.000 (0.011)
Observations	432	3631	995	2508	455	3631	998	2515
R^2	0.378	0.193	0.230	0.109	0.574	0.112	0.221	0.196
Mean (control group)	0.138	0.220	0.234	0.379	0.059	0.096	0.170	0.064
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.490	0.935	0.847	0.445	0.530	0.886	0.664	0.236

Note. Estimates based on OLS equations using equation 1. Columns (1) and (5) present estimates for leaders; columns (2) and (6) present estimates for migrants; columns (3) and (7) present estimates for residents; columns (4) and (8) present estimates for district relatives. Dependent variables by column: (1)-(4) Attrition from baseline to midline: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was not interviewed at midline; (5)-(8) Attrition from baseline to endline: dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent was not found at endline. ²All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level.

Table B2: Balance table - blocks

	Mean control (1)	Any treat (2)	TL (3)	TB (4)	p-value (5)	N (6)
Household proxy	145.27 [118.37]	-15.96* (8.39)	-11.17 (9.06)	-20.69** (9.95)	0.12	491
# sampled migrants	4.80 [2.62]	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.09)	0.69	491
Illegal construction	0.42 [0.50]	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.74	482
# of taxi drivers	25.34 [96.44]	-8.70 (6.31)	-8.05 (7.71)	-9.38 (5.69)	0.24	418
Distance to school	1.61 [0.84]	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.90	483
Distance to market	1.52 [0.82]	0.16** (0.08)	0.15 (0.09)	0.18* (0.10)	0.13	483
Distance to water fountain	1.55 [1.16]	0.00 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.12)	0.12 (0.12)	0.15	465

Note. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.

Table B3: Balance table - leaders

	Mean control (1)	Any treat (2)	TL (3)	TB (4)	p-value (5)	N (6)
Age	49.91 [12.21]	-1.00 (1.22)	-0.54 (1.39)	-1.46 (1.47)	0.61	441
Male	0.67 [0.47]	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.92	441
Married/cohabiting	0.72 [0.45]	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.60	441
Catholic	0.66 [0.48]	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.79	441
Literate	0.78 [0.42]	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.48	441
Primary schooling	0.42 [0.49]	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.74	441
Own dwelling	0.95 [0.23]	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.80	441
Years in position (leader)	3.59 [3.99]	0.34 (0.43)	0.13 (0.49)	0.55 (0.52)	0.56	441
Likes migrants	0.77 [0.42]	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.33	431
Gov. is helping the poor	0.02 [0.14]	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.59	434

Note. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.

Table B4: Balance table - migrants

	Mean control (1)	Any treat (2)	TL (3)	TB (4)	p-value (5)	N (6)
Age	24.32 [8.43]	-0.31 (0.29)	-0.27 (0.33)	-0.34 (0.32)	0.55	3583
Male	0.66 [0.48]	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.18	3633
Married/cohabiting	0.37 [0.48]	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.77	3628
Number of children	1.16 [1.68]	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.83	3508
Catholic	0.59 [0.49]	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.63	3520
Literate	0.66 [0.47]	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.48	3610
Primary schooling	0.32 [0.47]	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.19	3630
Primary occupation: none	0.22 [0.42]	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.07	2313
Contacted local leader (last 12 months)	0.24 [0.63]	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.79	2106
Moved to work	0.50 [0.50]	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.74	3633
Main struggle w/ moving: finding a job	0.33 [0.47]	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.32	3633
Main struggle w/ moving: making friends	0.14 [0.34]	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04	3633

Note. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.

Table B5: Balance table - residents

	Mean control (1)	Any treat (2)	TL (3)	TB (4)	p-value (5)	N (6)
Age	34.25 [14.68]	-0.75 (0.88)	-0.76 (1.03)	-0.74 (1.00)	0.70	991
Male	0.40 [0.49]	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.47	995
Married/cohabiting	0.46 [0.50]	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.22	995
Number of children	2.33 [2.25]	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.16)	0.59	994
Catholic	0.63 [0.48]	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.62	995
Literate	0.82 [0.39]	0.03 (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.21	978
Primary schooling	0.36 [0.48]	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.56	995
Contacted local leader (last 12 months)	0.40 [0.79]	0.13** (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)	0.15** (0.07)	0.07	965

Note. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.

Table B6: Balance table - district relatives

	Mean control (1)	Any treat (2)	TL (3)	TB (4)	p-value (5)	N (6)
Age	33.06 [8.22]	-0.67* (0.35)	-0.33 (0.42)	-0.95** (0.40)	0.05	2519
Male	0.56 [0.50]	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.19	2321
Married/cohabiting	0.47 [0.50]	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.74	1541
Number of children	2.24 [2.57]	0.07 (0.15)	0.28 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.17)	0.05	1535
Catholic	0.63 [0.48]	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.66	1529
Literate	0.86 [0.61]	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.37	1542
Primary schooling	0.35 [0.48]	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.64	1541
Primary occupation: none	0.18 [0.39]	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.70	1538
Primary occupation: student	0.06 [0.24]	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.96	1538

Note. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.

C Timeline




Figure C1: Timeline

D Measurement

D.1 Behavioral measurements

We provide below a photo of mobilized cyclists by a block leader (Figure D1) as well as the depiction of the stickers employed as part of the corresponding behavioral measurement (Figure D2).

Figure D1: Mobilized cyclists for political rally



Figure D2: Stickers



E Outcome variables

Table E1: Set of outcomes for program awareness

Topic	Variable and Description
Program knowledge	<p>Heard about program: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having heard of the program “<i>Quelimane trabalha com todos</i>”, and zero otherwise. The survey question is asked literally as represented in this table, without describing any details of what the program entailed. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>
Who is involved in the program?	<p>Self: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having been involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program “<i>Quelimane trabalha com todos</i>”. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent reports not having heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked whether they were involved in the program. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>Family: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that their family was involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program “<i>Quelimane trabalha com todos</i>”. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent reports not having heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked about whether their families were involved in the program. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>Block people: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that the people living in their block were involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program “<i>Quelimane trabalha com todos</i>”. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent had not heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked about whether the people in their block were involved. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>Rural migrants: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that rural migrants were involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program “<i>Quelimane trabalha com todos</i>”. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent reports not having heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked about whether the rural migrants were involved. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>

Table E2: Set of outcomes for interaction with block leader

Topic	Variable and Description
Leader knows migrants	<p>General: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the leader reports personally knowing migrants living in the same block as the respondent, and zero otherwise. This question did not specify any individuals. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>% sampled For this question, leaders was initially presented with a list of migrants living in their assigned blocks. The list displayed the names of all the people in that block who were sampled for this project (migrants and residents). The respondent was asked to select the names of the people with whom they were acquainted. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, and indicates the percentage of rural migrants that the leader selects from the list, out of the total number of migrants sampled in the block. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>
Leader’s social capital	<p>Social capital: Numerical variable that sums the total number of social groups that the respondent reports being part of. Examples consist of religious or savings groups. The leader was asked to enumerate each of the social groups that they’re part of, and the variable sums the total number enumerated. Additional details on the role of the leader in each of these groups were also asked and analyzed to guarantee variable accuracy. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>
Contact with leader	<p>Knows leader: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent correctly names the current leader in their living block, and zero otherwise. The respondents are asked to report the leader’s name, which was considered correct if it matched the one in the field records. The variable is self-reported. Due to a field mistake, the variable was not correctly collected during the second post-baseline survey wave and so the table presents results for the first post-baseline survey wave only. The same variable was not collected at baseline.</p> <p>Contacted leader: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent contacted reports having contacted the block leader in between survey waves, and zero otherwise. The variable represents the extensive margin as it does not dive into the purpose of the contact. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>

Table E3: Set of outcomes for campaigning and clientelism

Topic	Variable and Description
Leader mobilization	<p>Reports cyclists: This variable derives from the behavioral activity described in section D. Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the list delivered to the leaders contained at least one name of a cyclist to participate in the political bicycle rallies, and zero otherwise. Quelimane is largely dependent on bicycle taxi drivers as its main transportation method. These drivers have often been used by the incumbent Mayor for political campaigning through bicycle rallies. During the second post-baseline survey wave, block leaders were given a blank list to fill with names of bicycle taxi drivers living in their blocks that could be mobilized for these rallies. Field administrators conducted a second visit to the blocks to collect these lists. This visit was announced two days in advance, and block leaders were also instructed to request the people on the list to attend. These lists were collected up to two weeks after the initial visit. For names which did not attend the visit, field administrators confirmed their veracity with a phone call. The variable reflects whether the list contained at least one “true” name (extensive margin). This activity was not conducted during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p># cyclists reported: Numerical variable counting the number of names on the list distributed to the leaders. The variable reflects the total number of “true” names, confirmed both through attendance and phone calls (intensive margin). This activity was not conducted during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>Observed # mobilized Numerical variable counting the number of bicycle taxi drivers that attended the field team’s confirmation visit. Each of these people represents a roster entry in a confirmation survey. The registration was not conditional on prior record on the list, and it represents the sum of all the entered rosters. This activity was not conducted during the baseline survey wave.</p>
Clientelism	<p>Contacted the leader for a job: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having contacted the block leader for a job opportunity in the previous year, and zero otherwise. The variable was asked literally and it takes the value of one if the respondent answers “yes”. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>Paid the leader for a job: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having paid the block leader for a job opportunity in the previous year, and zero otherwise. The variable was asked literally and it takes the value of one if the respondent answers “yes”. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>

Table E4: Set of outcomes for political participation

Topic	Variable and Description
Political participation	<p>Party objects: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the field administrator identified any object with political content in the respondent's living place - which include hats, t-shirts, posters, pins, or others - and zero otherwise. The variable is observational: the field administrator was instructed not to ask the question but to observe the surroundings and report if any items were found. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>In a party (2024): Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports being a member of a political party, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported. The question was asked during the follow-up II phone survey conducted in December 2024, after the national 2024 elections in Mozambique.</p> <p>In RENAMO (2024): Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports being a member of the political party RENAMO, and zero otherwise. The variable was manually assigned to zero when the respondent reports not being part of a political party in general. The variable is self-reported. The question was asked during the follow-up II survey conducted in December 2024, after the national 2024 elections in Mozambique.</p> <p>Municipal elections 2023: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports intent to vote in the political party RENAMO for the 2023 local elections in Mozambique, and zero otherwise. The variable is missing if the respondent previously reported not having voted at all. The variable is self-reported. The variable was collected during the second post-baseline survey wave.</p> <p>Voted RENAMO/FRELIMO/PODEMOS (2024): Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having voted for the political party RENAMO/FRELIMO/PODEMOS during the 2024 national elections in Mozambique, and zero otherwise. The variable is missing if the respondent has previously reported not having voted at all. The variable is self-reported. The question was asked during the follow-up II survey conducted in December 2024, after the national 2024 elections in Mozambique.</p>
Holding partisan political objects:	<p>RENAMO/FRELIMO/MDM: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the field administrator identified any object with a political affiliation to RENAMO/FRELIMO/MDM at the respondent's living place - which include hats, t-shirts, posters, pins, or others -, and zero otherwise. The variable is observational: the field administrator was instructed not to ask the question but to observe the surroundings and report if any items were found. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The figure presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>
Turnout	<p>Inked finger: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent's finger was colored with purple ink at the time of the field team's visit, and zero otherwise. Mozambique has a long-standing tradition of marking fingers with ink after voting as a sign of voting participation. The ink mark should stay up to two or three days after. The field team visited the entire project sample in the two days following the 2023 local elections in Mozambique to check for the ink mark on the fingers. This measurement was collected in October 2023.</p>

Table E5: Set of outcomes for political support for local incumbent

Topic	Variable and Description
Stickers	<p>From leader: Variable ranging from 0 to 1 as a percentage of brown (leader) stickers found hanging at the front doors of the blocks' inhabitants. Each leader received 40 brown stickers, as presented in figure ??, and was instructed to distribute them to the population living in their block. Two weeks after, the field team was instructed to circle the sampled blocks and count the number of brown stickers identified hanging in front doors. This variable is constructed as the percent number out the 40 distributed identified in front doors. This activity was not conducted during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>From field team: Variable ranging from 0 to 1 as a percentage of pink (field team) stickers found hanging at the front doors of the blocks' inhabitants. Field administrators visited every migrant and resident in the sample to distribute a pink sticker, as presented in figure ??. Two weeks after, the field team was instructed to circle the sampled blocks and count the number of pink stickers identified hanging in front doors. This variable is constructed as the percentage of pink stickers found out of the total number of respondents (migrants and residents) sampled in each block. This activity was not conducted during the baseline survey wave.</p>
Support for incumbent	<p>Self-reported voting RENAMO: Variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having voted for RENAMO political party for the 2023 local elections in Mozambique, and zero otherwise. The variable was collected in the second post-baseline survey wave, which took place after the elections in October 2023. It was not possible to collect the same variable for block leaders as the survey for this subsample was implemented before the local elections. The same variable does not exist for the baseline survey.</p>

Table E6: Set of outcomes for migrants' integration

Topic	Variable and Description
Perceptions towards migrants' integration	<p>Migs. treated unfairly. Categorical variable with options <i>Never</i>, <i>Sometimes</i>, <i>Many times</i> and <i>Always</i> converted into a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent believes that rural migrants are unfairly treated always or many times, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported. For leaders, this question was only asked during the first post-baseline survey wave. The question was also not asked during the baseline survey. For migrants and residents, the same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The same question was also asked during the baseline survey wave and is included in the regression.</p> <p>Migs. are positive. Categorical variable with options <i>Very negative</i>, <i>Negative</i>, <i>Neither negative nor positive</i>, <i>Positive</i>, <i>Very positive</i> converted into a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent believes that rural migrants are positive or very positive, and zero otherwise. For migrants, the variable is equal to 1 if the respondent agrees that people view migrants in the city as positive or very positive, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported. For leaders, this question was only asked during the first post-baseline survey wave. The question was also not asked during the baseline survey. For migrants and residents, the same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The same question was also asked during the baseline survey wave and is included in the regression.</p>

Table E7: Set of outcomes for employment - migrants

Topic	Variable and Description
Job opportunities	<p>Heard of job (12 months): Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent heard of a job opportunity in the 12 months previous to the interview, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported by the migrant. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>Heard of job through program: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent heard of a job opening through the program “<i>Quelimane trabalha com todos</i>”, and zero otherwise. This variable was displayed in the survey conditional on having heard of a job opening in the 12 months previous to the interview date. The variable is missing if respondents had not heard of a job offer in the previous question. With this said, it represents all respondents who heard of a job opening through the program in the 12 months before the interview date. The variable is self-reported by the migrant. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>
Employment	<p>Working: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is currently employed and earning monetary compensation, and zero otherwise. Variable constructed from a categorical variable with multiple employment options, converted to 1 if the respondent selects any option other than student, retired or unemployed, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported by the migrant. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was asked during the baseline survey wave and is included as a control variable in the displayed regression.</p> <p>Tot # jobs: Variable summing the total number of jobs that the respondent reports having had since the beginning of the project. Respondents were asked whether they were currently employed and then the whole employment history was constructed since the project’s start. The variable represents the sum of all jobs that the respondent reports having had since October 2021.</p> <p># hours working: The variable is constructed out of a subset of 24 other variables, in which the respondent is asked about the activity conducted in each hour of the day before the interview date (options include <i>sleeping</i> or <i>eating</i>, for example). This variable is constructed by summing the number of hours the respondent reported being at work - urban or rural. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was asked during the baseline survey wave and is included as a control variable in the displayed regression.</p>
Wages	<p>Wage p/ week: Variable constructed by subtracting the mean to the reported wage per week and dividing by the standard deviation. It should be interpreted in standard deviation units. This variable is displayed conditional on the respondent being employed, and is considered as a missing for unemployed respondents. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>

Table E8: Set of outcomes for mobile money

Topic	Variable and Description
# services used	# services used: Variable constructed by summing the total number of available mobile money services that the respondent reports using. The respondent is asked to report all the features of mobile money that they use, and field administrators report it in a multiple option question. The variable is then constructed by summing all the selected options. The variable was collected in the first post-baseline survey wave. The same variable was not collected at baseline.
Transfers	<p>to district reported by migrant: Variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having sent mobile money transfers to someone close living in their origin district in the 30 days previous to the interview, and zero otherwise. This variable was collected in the first post-baseline survey wave. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>to district reported by district relative: Variable equal to 1 if the migrant's relative still living in the district reports having received a mobile money transfer from the migrant in the 30 days previous to the interview, and zero otherwise. This variable was collected in the first post-baseline survey wave. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>to migrant reported by migrant: Variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having sent mobile money transfers to someone close living in Quelimane in the 30 days previous to the interview, and zero otherwise. This variable was collected in the first post-baseline survey wave. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>to migrant reported by resident: Variable equal to 1 if the migrant's relative still living in the district reports having sent a mobile money transfer to the migrant in the 30 days previous to the interview, and zero otherwise. This variable was collected in the first post-baseline survey wave. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>

Table E9: Set of outcomes for migration

Topic	Variable and Description
Migrantion	<p>In Quelimane: Variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports being permanently living in Quelimane at the time of the interview, and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (3) employ data collected in the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. Column (4) uses data from a follow-up phone survey conducted in July 2024 with district relatives in which respondents were inquired about their current place of living. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p> <p>Likely to move: Indicator variable constructed from a categorical variable with options "<i>Very likely</i>", "<i>Likely</i>", "<i>Not very likely</i>" and "<i>Not likely at all</i>", in which respondents were asked about the likelihood of moving to Quelimane within the next year. The variable is equal to 1 if the respondent reports being "<i>Very likely</i>" or "<i>Likely</i>", and zero otherwise. The same variable was asked during the first and second post-baseline survey waves. The table presents the stacked version, which employs the two outcomes simultaneously. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.</p>

F Additional analysis

Table F1: The program - leaders

	Heard about program	Who is involved in the program?			
		Self	Family	Rural migrants	Block people
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.130*** (0.030)	0.184*** (0.036)	-0.005 (0.024)	0.125*** (0.033)	0.118*** (0.035)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.008 (0.032)	0.024 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.032)	-0.064* (0.037)
Observations	859	859	859	859	859
R^2	0.281	0.290	0.241	0.281	0.249
Mean (control group)	0.716	0.450	0.099	0.323	0.397
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.910	0.000	0.000

Note: Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3 (stacked regressions). The table presents results for block leaders. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Heard about program*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard about the program “Quelimane trabalha com todos”, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Self*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have been involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Family*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that his/her family was involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Block people*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that people living in the same block were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Rural migrants*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that rural migrants were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table E1. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table F2: The program - migrants

	Heard about program	Who is involved in the program?			
		Self	Family	Rural migrants	Block people
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.074*** (0.014)	0.092*** (0.017)	0.022** (0.010)	0.053*** (0.016)	0.040** (0.016)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.083*** (0.013)	0.089*** (0.017)	0.010 (0.010)	0.034** (0.017)	0.026* (0.015)
Observations	6104	6102	6104	6096	6101
R^2	0.208	0.238	0.164	0.142	0.182
Mean (control group)	0.704	0.584	0.093	0.283	0.295
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.479	0.856	0.207	0.237	0.404

Note: Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3 (stacked regressions). The table presents results for migrants. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Heard about program*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard about the program “Quelimane trabalha com todos”, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Self*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have been involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Family*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that his/her family was involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Block people*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that people living in the same block were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Rural migrants*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that rural migrants were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table E1. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table F3: The program - residents

	Heard about program	Who is involved in the program?			
		Self	Family	Rural migrants	Block people
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(TL) Leader treatment	-0.004 (0.022)	0.005 (0.025)	0.010 (0.018)	0.040* (0.023)	0.016 (0.022)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.041* (0.023)	-0.037 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.017)	0.016 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.022)
Observations	1575	1575	1574	1575	1573
R^2	0.444	0.362	0.211	0.274	0.270
Mean (control group)	0.595	0.416	0.105	0.196	0.248
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.095	0.085	0.288	0.283	0.350

Note: Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3 (stacked regressions). The table presents results for residents. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Heard about program*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard about the program “Quelimane trabalha com todos”, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Self*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have been involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Family*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that his/her family was involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Block people*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that people living in the same block were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Rural migrants*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that rural migrants were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table E1. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table F4: The program - district relatives

	Heard about program (1)	Who is involved in the program?	
		Self (2)	Rural migrants (3)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.031* (0.017)	0.024 (0.015)	0.009 (0.006)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.003 (0.017)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.006)
Observations	3804	3795	3794
R^2	0.144	0.133	0.078
Mean (control group)	0.219	0.184	0.025
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.116	0.669	0.097

Note: Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3 (stacked regressions). The table presents results for district relatives. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Heard about program*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard about the program ‘Quelimane trabalha com todos’, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Self*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have been involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Family*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that his/her family was involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Block people*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that people living in the same block were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Rural migrants*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that rural migrants were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table E1. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table F5: Holding partisan political objects - 2023

	Migrants			Residents		
	RENAMO (1)	FRELIMO (2)	MDM (3)	RENAMO (4)	FRELIMO (5)	MDM (6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.009* (0.005)	0.008** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.013 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.005* (0.003)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.017*** (0.005)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.003)
Observations	6103	6103	6103	1572	1572	1572
R ²	0.076	0.064	0.035	0.186	0.127	0.133
Mean (control group)	0.029	0.018	0.003	0.044	0.039	0.006
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.104	0.703	0.588	0.134	0.392	0.125

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1)-(2) use equation 3, employing the the midline and endline (stacked regressions). We did not collect the lagged values for any of the dependent variables. Columns (1)-(3) present results for migrants; columns (4)-(6) present results for residents. Dependent variables by column: (1) and (4) *RENAMO*: observational variable equal to 1 if the enumerator identified any object belonging to the respondent and corresponding to the political party *RENAMO* during the survey interview, and 0 otherwise; (2) and (5) *FRELIMO*: observational variable equal to 1 if the enumerator identified any object belonging to the respondent and corresponding to the political party *FRELIMO* during the survey interview, and 0 otherwise; (3) and (6) *MDM*: observational variable equal to 1 if the enumerator identified any object belonging to the respondent and corresponding to the political party *MDM* during the survey interview, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table E4. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table F6: Leaders' political behavior

	In a party (2024)	In RENAMO (2024)	Municipal elections 2023	Presidential elections 2024		
			RENAMO (3)	RENAMO (4)	FRELIMO (5)	PODEMOS (6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.030 (0.048)	0.051 (0.050)	0.005 (0.007)	0.143* (0.073)	-0.029 (0.022)	-0.103 (0.075)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.077 (0.051)	-0.062 (0.053)	0.001 (0.011)	0.156** (0.070)	-0.038* (0.021)	-0.112 (0.070)
Observations	343	341	369	309	309	309
R ²	0.450	0.440	0.417	0.467	0.412	0.454
Mean (control group)	0.856	0.838	0.992	0.392	0.039	0.559
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.055	0.047	0.601	0.855	0.475	0.904
Outcome data	Follow-up II	Follow-up II	Endline	Follow-up II	Follow-up II	Follow-up II

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(6) show results from a phone survey conducted after the 2024 national elections in Mozambique. Column (3) shows results for the endline survey. We do not include the lagged values of any of the dependent variables. Dependent variables by columns: (1) *In a party (2024)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be affiliated to a political party, and 0 otherwise; (2) *In RENAMO (2024)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be affiliated to RENAMO, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Municipal elections 2023 – RENAMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for RENAMO in the 2023 municipal elections, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Presidential elections 2024 – RENAMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for RENAMO in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Presidential elections 2024 – FRELIMO*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for FRELIMO in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise; (6) *Presidential elections 2024 – PODEMOS*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have voted for PODEMOS in the 2024 national elections, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table E4. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table F7: Views about migrants' integration

	Migrants unfairly treated			Migrants are positive		
	Leader (1)	Migrant (2)	Resident (3)	Leader (4)	Migrant (5)	Resident (6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.093* (0.049)	0.012 (0.008)	0.012 (0.012)	0.120* (0.065)	0.003 (0.019)	0.063** (0.029)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.017 (0.050)	0.003 (0.008)	0.014 (0.012)	0.112* (0.066)	0.001 (0.019)	0.048 (0.030)
Observations	339	3568	1492	347	5948	1537
R^2	0.408	0.095	0.156	0.466	0.120	0.226
Mean (control group)	0.110	0.052	0.033	0.463	0.453	0.445
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.156	0.336	0.880	0.899	0.931	0.576
Outcome data	Midline	Pooled	Pooled	Midline	Pooled	Pooled

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1) and (4) use equation 1, and include data from the midline survey. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) use equation 3, employing the midline and endline surveys (stacked regressions). Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) include the lagged value of the dependent variable as a control. We did not collect the lagged values for columns (1) and (4). Columns (1) and (4) show results for block leaders; columns (2) and (5) show results for migrants; columns (3) and (6) show results for residents. Dependent variables by column: (1)-(3) *Migrants treated unfairly*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that migrants are frequently or very frequently treated unfairly by community members, and 0 otherwise; (4)-(6) *Migrants are positive*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement that migrants are positive for the community, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the Appendix in Table E6. All specifications include block and individual controls, as well as strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

G Treatment intensity

Table G1: Treatment intensity - migrant indexes

	Program awareness (1)	Interaction w/ leader (2)	Clientelism (3)	Pol. Participation (4)	Pol. support (5)	Integration (6)	Job offers (7)	Employment (8)	Wages (9)	Mobile money (10)	Migration (11)
nroundstl	0.032*** (0.009)	0.014 (0.011)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.023)	0.048*** (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	-0.021 (0.014)	0.019 (0.017)	0.070*** (0.019)	-0.087*** (0.021)
Rounds TB	0.036*** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)	0.019** (0.008)	0.015 (0.013)	0.014** (0.006)	0.060*** (0.007)	-0.017** (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.024** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.009)
Leader filmed the video	0.031 (0.040)	0.046 (0.041)	0.007 (0.044)	0.032 (0.055)	0.134 (0.084)	-0.112*** (0.041)	0.109** (0.047)	0.025 (0.052)	-0.275*** (0.077)	-0.140** (0.063)	0.109 (0.071)
Leader attended visit	0.004 (0.038)	0.027 (0.040)	-0.016 (0.046)	0.092 (0.058)	-0.070 (0.090)	-0.019 (0.043)	0.072 (0.049)	0.095* (0.050)	0.165** (0.072)	-0.098 (0.068)	0.187*** (0.069)
Observations	6091	6105	6079	3027	2084	5716	1714	6100	4704	2849	3579
R ²	0.243	0.200	0.042	0.137	0.106	0.110	0.307	0.185	0.082	0.152	0.099
Mean (control group)	0.006	-0.065	-0.001	0.054	-0.003	0.004	0.974	0.026	-0.003	0.002	0.012
TLI = TBI (p-value)	0.695	0.219	0.461	0.140	0.212	0.007	0.003	0.827	0.423	0.021	0.008

H Heterogeneous effects

Table H1: Heterogeneous effects: first vs. second migrants' wave

Outcome variable	First wave					Second wave				
	TL		TB		N	TL		TB		N
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.		Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Panel A: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.12***	0.03	0.08***	0.02	3728	0.15***	0.03	0.14***	0.03	2363
Interaction w/ block leader	0.12***	0.03	-0.03	0.03	3740	0.08**	0.03	0.01	0.03	2365
Clientelism	0.05*	0.03	0.06*	0.04	3721	0.11**	0.04	0.06	0.04	2358
Political participation	0.13***	0.04	0.10**	0.04	1851	0.07	0.05	0.10**	0.05	1168
Political support	0.03	0.07	0.11*	0.06	1281	-0.01	0.09	0.08	0.09	763
Migrants' integration	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	3499	0.11***	0.03	0.10***	0.03	2216
Job offers	0.19***	0.04	0.15***	0.04	1020	0.30***	0.05	0.33***	0.05	657
Employment	0.08**	0.04	-0.03	0.04	3737	-0.01	0.05	-0.09*	0.05	2363
Wages	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.05	2861	-0.04	0.05	0.06	0.05	1841
Mobile money	0.05	0.04	0.12**	0.05	1717	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.05	1125
Migration	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	3727	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	2354
Panel B: District relatives										
Program awareness	0.07*	0.04	0.00	0.04	2144	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	1716
Political support	0.00	0.07	-0.02	0.07	1149	-0.22***	0.08	-0.11	0.07	912
Mobile money	-0.08	0.06	0.04	0.06	1433	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.06	1111
Migration	0.04	0.04	0.07*	0.04	1612	0.15***	0.04	0.11**	0.04	1308

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category.

Table H2: Heterogeneous effects: leader is male vs. female

Outcome variable	Leader is male					Leader is female				
	TL		TB		N	TL		TB		N
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.		Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.28***	0.07	-0.04	0.07	525	0.04	0.09	-0.30***	0.11	264
Interaction w/ block people	0.15*	0.08	-0.01	0.08	494	0.33**	0.14	0.10	0.15	248
Campaigning	0.18	0.15	0.33**	0.15	222	0.35	0.28	-0.12	0.28	69
Political participation	0.14	0.15	0.22	0.16	213	0.14	0.36	-0.14	0.37	59
Political support	0.12	0.11	0.05	0.11	222	0.03	0.13	-0.03	0.16	69
Migrants' integration	0.16	0.14	-0.01	0.14	188	0.44	0.29	0.19	0.36	63
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.11***	0.03	0.10***	0.03	3620	0.16***	0.05	0.10*	0.06	1923
Interaction w/ block leader	0.09**	0.03	0.01	0.03	3627	0.05	0.05	-0.10*	0.06	1928
Clientelism	0.06*	0.03	0.04	0.03	3612	-0.04	0.06	0.01	0.06	1921
Political participation	0.09*	0.05	0.13***	0.04	1826	-0.06	0.07	0.04	0.09	938
Political support	-0.15**	0.06	0.02	0.07	1230	0.27***	0.09	0.45***	0.10	677
Migrants' integration	0.06*	0.03	0.08***	0.03	3403	0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.06	1802
Job offers	0.16***	0.04	0.20***	0.04	1001	0.25***	0.07	0.16**	0.07	549
Employment	0.04	0.05	-0.02	0.05	3625	0.00	0.06	-0.03	0.08	1925
Wages	-0.00	0.04	0.08**	0.03	2771	-0.18	0.12	-0.03	0.10	1507
Mobile money	-0.03	0.05	0.04	0.05	1691	0.17*	0.09	0.08	0.12	899
Migration	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	3615	-0.01	0.01	-0.02*	0.01	1917
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.00	0.05	-0.06	0.04	901	-0.08	0.06	-0.02	0.07	499
Interaction w/ block leader	0.09	0.07	-0.01	0.06	901	-0.11	0.10	-0.35***	0.11	501
Clientelism	0.16*	0.09	0.01	0.06	898	0.12	0.17	0.16	0.37	496
Political participation	0.02	0.09	0.03	0.09	422	-0.35*	0.20	-0.27	0.18	229
Political support	0.06	0.18	-0.28	0.17	278	-0.22	0.29	-0.02	0.39	160
Migrants' integration	0.12**	0.06	0.15**	0.07	841	0.08	0.10	-0.15	0.12	454
Panel D: District relatives										
Program awareness	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.04	2274	0.21***	0.07	0.00	0.08	1244
Political support	-0.04	0.07	0.02	0.07	1230	-0.37***	0.13	-0.33**	0.15	657
Mobile money	-0.13*	0.07	0.01	0.05	1517	0.07	0.13	0.04	0.15	830
Migration	0.11***	0.04	0.05	0.04	1699	0.08	0.06	0.11*	0.06	943

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category.

Table H3: Heterogeneous effects: leader's age

Outcome variable	Leader is <50 years old					Leader is ≥50 years old				
	TL		TB		N	TL		TB		N
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.		Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.25***	0.07	-0.02	0.08	475	0.29***	0.11	-0.03	0.11	314
Interaction w/ block people	0.19**	0.09	0.05	0.10	447	0.17	0.11	-0.13	0.14	297
Campaigning	0.29*	0.17	0.29	0.20	186	0.27*	0.15	0.19	0.18	100
Political participation	-0.10	0.16	-0.13	0.18	178	0.23	0.25	0.27	0.30	92
Political support	0.04	0.09	-0.02	0.10	186	0.21	0.14	0.12	0.23	100
Migrants' integration	0.28*	0.15	0.29*	0.17	142	0.21	0.23	0.07	0.24	79
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.14***	0.04	0.09***	0.03	3215	0.19***	0.04	0.17***	0.05	2328
Interaction w/ block leader	0.03	0.04	-0.04	0.04	3219	0.06	0.03	-0.09**	0.04	2336
Clientelism	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	3203	0.07	0.05	0.09	0.07	2330
Political participation	0.01	0.04	-0.05	0.04	1604	0.19***	0.06	0.10	0.08	1162
Political support	-0.02	0.10	0.13	0.09	1068	0.10	0.07	-0.01	0.07	841
Migrants' integration	0.02	0.03	0.09***	0.03	3018	0.08*	0.04	-0.05	0.05	2187
Job offers	0.33***	0.05	0.32***	0.05	941	0.15***	0.05	0.15**	0.06	616
Employment	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.05	3215	0.14**	0.06	0.09	0.07	2335
Wages	-0.14**	0.06	-0.01	0.06	2477	0.05	0.05	0.19**	0.08	1799
Mobile money	-0.06	0.05	0.01	0.06	1507	0.12*	0.07	0.03	0.08	1086
Migration	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	3206	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	2326
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.03	0.05	-0.00	0.05	828	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.08	568
Interaction w/ block leader	0.00	0.07	-0.02	0.07	829	0.12	0.07	-0.18***	0.07	569
Clientelism	0.06	0.08	-0.02	0.09	823	0.36*	0.20	-0.01	0.18	568
Political participation	-0.24**	0.10	-0.11	0.10	387	-0.14	0.12	-0.07	0.15	263
Political support	-0.23	0.22	-0.24	0.20	245	0.10	0.20	-0.32	0.21	186
Migrants' integration	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.08	758	0.13	0.09	0.04	0.12	536
Panel D: District relatives										
Program awareness	0.12***	0.04	0.05	0.04	1984	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.06	1536
Political support	-0.20**	0.09	-0.10	0.09	1068	0.08	0.09	-0.01	0.12	824
Mobile money	0.08	0.06	-0.02	0.06	1321	-0.05	0.06	-0.04	0.07	1027
Migration	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.05	1473	0.05	0.04	-0.05	0.04	1169

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category.

Table H4: Heterogeneous effects: leader is new vs. experienced

Outcome variable	New leaders (<2y experience)					Leader is experienced (≥2y experience)				
	TL		TB		N	TL		TB		N
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.		Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.35**	0.14	-0.13	0.12	268	0.20***	0.07	-0.10	0.07	521
Interaction w/ block people	0.29	0.17	-0.05	0.15	250	0.16*	0.09	0.10	0.09	492
Campaigning	-0.09	0.27	0.23	0.37	73	0.20	0.15	0.21	0.14	210
Political participation	-0.34	0.31	0.06	0.23	62	0.23	0.17	0.04	0.17	202
Political support	-0.01	0.16	-0.07	0.13	73	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.09	210
Migrants' integration	0.61**	0.26	0.48*	0.25	61	0.24	0.15	0.10	0.15	164
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.05	1922	0.18***	0.03	0.12***	0.03	3698
Interaction w/ block leader	-0.06	0.04	-0.12***	0.04	1927	0.10***	0.04	0.03	0.03	3705
Clientelism	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	1921	0.09**	0.04	0.09**	0.04	3689
Political participation	0.13*	0.07	0.11*	0.06	930	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	1868
Political support	0.13	0.08	0.08	0.10	658	-0.02	0.09	0.15*	0.08	1262
Migrants' integration	0.16***	0.06	0.06	0.05	1807	0.04	0.03	0.10***	0.04	3458
Job offers	0.24**	0.10	0.13	0.08	446	0.17***	0.04	0.19***	0.04	1131
Employment	0.07	0.06	0.03	0.06	1924	0.01	0.05	-0.10**	0.05	3703
Wages	-0.02	0.06	0.11*	0.06	1476	-0.09*	0.05	-0.01	0.05	2860
Mobile money	0.25**	0.11	0.19**	0.09	896	-0.01	0.05	0.08	0.05	1730
Migration	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	1921	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	3688
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.08	0.09	-0.03	0.07	481	0.07	0.05	-0.01	0.05	936
Interaction w/ block leader	0.06	0.09	-0.08	0.09	481	0.16***	0.05	-0.04	0.06	938
Clientelism	0.05	0.19	0.24	0.25	479	0.15	0.10	0.05	0.06	932
Political participation	0.00	0.18	0.14	0.16	204	-0.10	0.11	0.04	0.09	442
Political support	-0.17	0.27	-0.19	0.28	129	-0.07	0.21	-0.05	0.19	304
Migrants' integration	0.15	0.09	-0.04	0.11	437	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.07	871
Panel D: District relatives										
Program awareness	0.10	0.06	0.13**	0.05	1162	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.05	2407
Political support	-0.24	0.16	0.10	0.14	597	-0.11	0.08	-0.07	0.07	1327
Mobile money	0.11	0.08	-0.05	0.06	776	-0.12	0.07	0.03	0.06	1599
Migration	0.17**	0.08	0.22**	0.09	871	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.03	1808

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category.

Table H5: Heterogeneous effects: Leader's support for RENAMO

Outcome variable	Leader is RENAMO declared supporter					Leader is not RENAMO declared supporter				
	TL		TB		N	TL		TB		N
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.		Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.35***	0.07	0.01	0.06	564	0.28	0.20	-0.08	0.18	230
Interaction w/ block people	0.18**	0.08	0.02	0.08	538	0.17	0.28	0.22	0.26	206
Campaigning	0.38**	0.15	0.40***	0.15	236	-0.07	0.22	0.03	0.24	52
Political participation	0.16	0.17	0.28*	0.17	219	0.32	0.31	0.21	0.20	46
Political support	0.14	0.10	0.04	0.09	236	-0.29**	0.14	-0.47**	0.17	52
Migrants' integration	0.09	0.14	0.03	0.15	189	0.24	0.36	-0.23	0.44	43
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.16***	0.03	0.12***	0.03	3948	-0.11**	0.05	-0.03	0.05	1595
Interaction w/ block leader	0.10***	0.03	-0.02	0.03	3957	-0.08	0.07	-0.00	0.07	1598
Clientelism	0.10***	0.03	0.05	0.04	3945	0.01	0.07	-0.02	0.06	1588
Political participation	0.14***	0.04	0.09**	0.04	1958	-0.21***	0.08	-0.13	0.10	807
Political support	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.06	1338	0.12	0.21	0.21	0.24	569
Migrants' integration	0.09**	0.04	0.05	0.03	3707	0.12***	0.04	0.18***	0.04	1497
Job offers	0.21***	0.04	0.19***	0.04	1110	0.21***	0.07	0.31***	0.06	445
Employment	0.01	0.04	-0.03	0.04	3954	0.20*	0.11	0.12	0.11	1596
Wages	-0.02	0.04	0.05	0.04	3006	-0.02	0.08	0.08	0.10	1272
Mobile money	0.14***	0.05	0.15***	0.05	1847	-0.02	0.11	-0.17	0.12	744
Migration	0.01	0.01	0.02**	0.01	3941	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	1591
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.02	0.05	-0.02	0.04	993	0.12	0.09	0.04	0.11	407
Interaction w/ block leader	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.06	995	-0.14	0.10	-0.11	0.12	407
Clientelism	0.23**	0.10	0.05	0.06	991	0.19	0.30	0.08	0.39	404
Political participation	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.08	463	0.04	0.23	-0.03	0.31	184
Political support	-0.05	0.17	-0.00	0.17	320	-0.35	0.43	-0.28	0.51	128
Migrants' integration	0.08	0.07	-0.03	0.07	929	-0.06	0.13	0.02	0.17	369
Panel D: District relatives										
Program awareness	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.04	2444	0.13	0.10	0.00	0.09	1075
Political support	-0.10	0.08	-0.14*	0.07	1322	-0.00	0.17	0.20	0.18	569
Mobile money	-0.03	0.08	0.02	0.07	1617	-0.02	0.12	0.09	0.09	730
Migration	0.05	0.04	-0.02	0.04	1823	-0.06	0.08	-0.06	0.07	818

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category.

Table H6: Heterogeneous effects: Migrant density - median

Outcome variable	# migrants above median					# migrants below median				
	TL		TB		N	TL		TB		N
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.		Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
Panel A: Leaders										
Program awareness	0.23***	0.07	-0.08	0.07	440	0.24***	0.07	-0.01	0.07	412
Interaction w/ block people	0.14*	0.08	0.01	0.08	420	0.22**	0.10	0.09	0.10	383
Campaigning	0.14	0.17	0.04	0.18	199	0.32**	0.13	0.32***	0.12	205
Political participation	0.22	0.14	0.02	0.14	188	0.21	0.21	0.24	0.20	187
Political support	0.01	0.08	0.06	0.07	199	0.12	0.10	0.02	0.12	205
Migrants' integration	0.20	0.16	0.12	0.17	154	0.40**	0.15	0.30**	0.15	152
Panel B: Migrants										
Program awareness	0.19***	0.03	0.16***	0.03	3955	-0.00	0.04	-0.01	0.03	2136
Interaction w/ block leader	0.13***	0.03	0.01	0.03	3967	0.07*	0.04	-0.05	0.04	2138
Clientelism	0.05*	0.03	0.06*	0.03	3955	0.10*	0.05	0.05	0.05	2124
Political participation	0.13***	0.04	0.09**	0.04	1948	0.12**	0.05	0.14**	0.06	1079
Political support	-0.01	0.07	0.06	0.07	1347	-0.00	0.08	0.14*	0.07	735
Migrants' integration	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	3738	0.13***	0.04	0.08**	0.04	1978
Job offers	0.22***	0.03	0.21***	0.04	1132	0.14**	0.06	0.13**	0.06	580
Employment	0.02	0.04	-0.10**	0.04	3965	0.06	0.05	-0.04	0.05	2135
Wages	-0.03	0.05	0.02	0.05	3080	-0.01	0.07	0.01	0.06	1624
Mobile money	0.07	0.05	0.13***	0.05	1860	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.07	989
Migration	-0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.01	3951	0.01	0.01	0.02*	0.01	2130
Panel C: Residents										
Program awareness	0.04	0.05	-0.07	0.05	793	-0.02	0.05	-0.04	0.04	777
Interaction w/ block leader	0.13**	0.06	-0.00	0.07	793	0.07	0.06	-0.06	0.06	779
Clientelism	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.11	788	0.26**	0.12	0.02	0.08	775
Political participation	0.03	0.09	0.08	0.09	365	-0.12	0.10	-0.08	0.09	386
Political support	-0.27	0.17	0.04	0.18	248	-0.04	0.15	-0.14	0.16	270
Migrants' integration	0.12*	0.07	0.15**	0.07	740	0.11*	0.06	0.03	0.06	715
Panel D: District relatives										
Program awareness	0.10**	0.04	0.04	0.04	2436	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.05	1432
Political support	-0.10	0.07	-0.05	0.07	1325	-0.13*	0.07	-0.12	0.08	762
Mobile money	-0.12*	0.06	-0.02	0.06	1652	0.11*	0.06	0.11*	0.06	910
Migration	0.12***	0.04	0.08**	0.04	1810	0.07	0.05	0.09*	0.05	1109

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Outcomes are grouped in indices that are built using the procedure followed by Kling et al. (2007): outcomes are first normalized to study mean effect sizes of the indices relative to the standard deviation of the control group and then averaged within each category.

I Robustness to selection of control variables

Table I1: Description of variables included in the PDSL procedure

Variable group	Description
Block characteristics	Stratum indicator variables. Indicator variables for whether there is illegal construction in the block. Categorical variable measuring the number of migrants sampled at baseline, the block population (approximate), the number of bicycle taxi drivers, the distance to nearest school, nearest market and nearest water fountain.
Leader characteristics	
Demographics	Indicator variables for sex, whether the respondent is married, illiterate, has less than primary education, has primary education, is catholic and is muslim. Categorical variables for age reported in number of years and household size.
Wealth	Indicator variable for whether the respondent owns their flat.
Political	Indicator variable for whether the leader is a member of RENAMO political party at baseline, voted for RENAMO in 2018 and 2019 elections, likes migrants and is employed. Categorical variable for number of years as the block leader.
Migrant characteristics	
Demographics	Indicator variables for sex, whether the respondent is married, illiterate, has less than primary education, has primary education, is catholic, is muslim, has no occupation at baseline, is a student at baseline, is working at baseline, moved to Quelimane for work. Categorical variables for age reported in number of years, number of children and household size.
Migration	Indicator variables for whether the main struggle at baseline was finding a job, main struggle at baseline was making friends, feeling a strong connection to Quelimane at baseline and feeling discriminated at baseline. Average of 4 indicator variables as an index for trust (trust in market seller, in the Mozambican president, in the provincial government and in the mayor of Quelimane).
Wealth	Indicator variables for whether the respondent rents their flat, owns their flat, has walls made of concrete, has floors made of concrete, has a roof made of zinc, owns a bank account, owns a radio, a television, a mattress, a fan, a motorcycle, a fridge, a phone, a bicycle and a solar panel. Average of 3 variables (walls, floor made of concrete, and roof made of zinc) as an indicator of house quality.

Note. Migrant characteristics are included only in the PDSL procedure for migrant-level outcomes. All continuous outcomes are also included in their squared term and are standardized. To have the same sample size in the Post-ModelSelection and PDSL, for all variables, missing values are replaced by 0 and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the observation was missing is included for all variables.

Table I2: Comparison with PDSL: leader outcomes

Outcome variable	Post-Model Selection				Post-Double Selection LASSO				N
	T1		T2		T1		T2		
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Heard about program	0.12	0.03	-0.03	0.04	0.13	0.03	-0.01	0.03	862
Involved in program	0.16	0.04	-0.00	0.04	0.18	0.03	0.01	0.03	862
Family was involved in program	-0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02	862
Block people were involved in program	0.09	0.04	-0.09	0.04	0.11	0.03	-0.07	0.03	862
Rural migrants were involved in program	0.12	0.04	-0.02	0.04	0.12	0.03	-0.04	0.03	862
Knows migrants (general)	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.03	0.05	0.03	816
Knows sampled migrants	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.02	862
Social capital	0.10	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.04	862
Reports mobilizing	0.10	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.11	0.04	0.07	0.04	456
# people reported	1.18	1.06	1.55	1.11	1.25	0.77	1.21	0.81	809
Observed # mobilized	0.68	0.37	0.67	0.37	0.63	0.32	0.57	0.30	456
Inked finger	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.03	429
Share brown stickers	0.05	0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.00	0.01	888
Share pink stickers	-0.02	0.05	0.03	0.07	-0.00	0.04	0.03	0.04	883
Migrants are unfairly treated	0.12	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.01	0.04	388
Migrants are positive	0.12	0.06	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.05	0.09	0.05	396

Note. Estimates based on OLS regression using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. In columns (1)-(4), the specifications are constant across outcome variables (see section 4). In columns (5)-(8), the specifications are outcome-specific and include individual and block-level controls, selected using the Post-Double Selection LASSO (PDSL) procedure (Belloni et al. (2013)). The full list of control variables included in the procedure are presented in table I1.

Table I3: Comparison with PDSL: migrant outcomes

Outcome variable	Post-Model Selection				Post-Double Selection LASSO				N
	T1		T2		T1		T2		
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Heard about program	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.08	0.01	6104
Involved in program	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.03	0.09	0.02	0.09	0.02	6102
Family was involved in program	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	6104
Block people were involved in program	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	6101
Rural migrants were involved in program	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.02	6096
Knows block leader	0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.02	6105
Contacted block leader	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	6105
Contacted leader for job	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	6089
Paid leader for job	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	6089
Inked finger	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	3323
Party objects	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	6103
Voted RENAMO	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	2088
Migrants are unfairly treated	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	5842
Migrants are positive	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	5948
Working	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.01	6100
Tot # jobs	0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.02	6100
Wage	-0.01	0.04	0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	4704
Hours working p/day	0.24	0.22	-0.23	0.22	0.39	0.15	-0.16	0.16	6105
Tot. # mobile money services used	0.16	0.13	0.24	0.14	0.18	0.10	0.25	0.10	2850
Made transfers to district relatives	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.02	2850
Made transfers to urban relatives	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	2850
In Quelimane	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	6081

Note. Estimates based on OLS regression using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. In columns (1)-(4), the specifications are constant across outcome variables (see section 4). In columns (5)-(8), the specifications are outcome-specific and include individual and block-level controls, selected using the Post-Double Selection LASSO (PDSL) procedure (Belloni et al. (2013)). The full list of control variables included in the procedure are presented in table I1.

Table I4: Comparison with PDSL: residents outcomes

Outcome variable	Post-Model Selection				Post-Double Selection LASSO				N
	T1		T2		T1		T2		
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Heard about program	-0.01	0.03	-0.05	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.05	0.02	1576
Involved in program	-0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.04	0.02	1576
Family was involved in program	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02	1575
Block people were involved in program	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.02	1574
Rural migrants were involved in program	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	1576
Knows block leader	0.04	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.02	1576
Contacted block leader	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.02	-0.00	0.02	1576
Contacted leader for job	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	1572
Paid leader for job	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	1570
Inked finger	-0.05	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.06	0.03	0.02	0.03	813
Party objects	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	1573
Voted RENAMO	-0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.04	-0.07	0.03	-0.05	0.03	554
Migrants are unfairly treated	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	1495
Migrants are positive	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03	1538

Note. Estimates based on OLS regression using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. In columns (1)-(4), the specifications are constant across outcome variables (see section 4). In columns (5)-(8), the specifications are outcome-specific and include individual and block-level controls, selected using the Post-Double Selection LASSO (PDSL) procedure (Belloni et al. (2013)). The full list of control variables included in the procedure are presented in table I1.

Table I5: Comparison with PDSL: district residents outcomes

Outcome variable	Post-Model Selection				Post-Double Selection LASSO				N
	T1		T2		T1		T2		
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Heard about program	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	3867
Family was involved in program	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	3858
Rural migrants were involved in program	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.01	3857
Voted RENAMO	-0.04	0.04	-0.04	0.04	-0.04	0.02	-0.03	0.02	2096
Received transfers from urban relative	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	2577
Made transfers to urban relative	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	2573
Likely to move	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01	3786
In Quelimane	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	3014
In Quelimane (7 months post)	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.01	5031

Note. Estimates based on OLS regression using equation 1. TL refers to leader treatment, TB refers to basic treatment (see section B of the main text). Standard errors are reported in columns (2),(4),(6) and (8) and clustered at the block level. In columns (1)-(4), the specifications are constant across outcome variables (see section 4). In columns (5)-(8), the specifications are outcome-specific and include individual and block-level controls, selected using the Post-Double Selection LASSO (PDSL) procedure (Belloni et al. (2013)). The full list of control variables included in the procedure are presented in table I1.